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The purpose of this study was to investigate the long-tenn relation between 
household leverage through the use of mortgages, and changes in household wea llh 
using the theoretical framework of the life cycle income hypothesis . The results of 
this sltldy are relevant to current positions regarding househo ld leverage via 
mortgages. This study used the 1992 through 2002 waves of the Health and 
Retirement Study. The characteristics of leveraged and unleveraged households were 
compared in 1992 and 2002 as were changes during that period. The relation between 
household leverage and changes in assets and total resources over the period was 
modeled using robust regression analysis. 
Based on the results of independent 1 tests and chi-square tests, there were 
statistically significant differences between leveraged and unleveraged households. 
The general difference between the two groups was that greater proportions of 
leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 than unleveraged households. 
This observation was supported by differences in household income, work status 
trends, age of household head , total resources, and changes in total resources. 
Unleveraged households had stat isti cal ly significantl y higher assets than leveraged 
households; however, there was no statistically significant difference in the change in 
assets between the two groups. 
Retained or incurred mortgage debt during the study period, relative to not 
hav ing mortgage debt, had a consistent negative effect on changes in assets and total 
resources. The in itial leverage ratio and square of the initial leverage ratio were not 
sta ti sti cally significant in either of the estimated regress ion models. The effect of 
el iminating mortgage debt, relative to not having mortgage debt, on changes in assets 
and total resources was not statistically different from zero. 
IV 
From the standpoint of maximizi ng resources, maintaining mortgage debt did 
not appear to be the best altemative for most households. However, for high-income 
and more risk-tolerant households, mortgage debt was benefi cial and enhanced 
increases in assets and total resources. Wh il e the use of mortgage debt for investment 
capital had the potential to increase total resources, households may have derived 
greater satisfaction from using the mortgage proceeds for consumption, given their 
preferences and expectat ions. Implications for consumers, financial professionals, 
educators, and tax policymakers were drawn from the resu lts of the study. 
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CHAPTER I 
lNTRODUCTION 
Background of the Study 
Consumers looking for financial advice regarding mortgage debt and 
household leverage find contradicting op inions in both the popular and professional 
press. Many in the financial community argue that mortgage debt, with its low cost 
and favorable tax treatment, provides excellent capi tal for investing. Others counter, 
arguing that debt is debt and the interest rate charged on mortgage debt is a high 
hurdle for the average ri sk-averse investor to overcome (Goff & Cox , 1998; Onnan, 
n.d .; Stonns, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002). 
The lack of a consensus among financial wri ters and planners has left 
consumers without a clear underswnding of whether mortgage debt, aside from the 
purchase of a home, can be beneficial in a househo ld 's financial portfolio. This 
question has been approached from a theoretical perspective using Monte Carlo 
simulations and other bootstrap stat istical models (Palmer, 2002; Tom linson, 2002), 
and also from a practitioner's perspective with the use of case studies and 
hypothet ical scenarios (Goff & Cox, 1998; Stonns, 1996, 2000). Both methods 
inadequately address the long-tem1 consequences of household leverage through 
mortgage use, since neither method addresses actual household behavior, nor provides 
a means for a retrospective ana lysis of the decision. 
An actual examinat ion of leveraged and unleveraged households is necessary 
to understand their behavior and whether either circumstance yields positive 
economic benefits to the household . There is an absence of empirical studies 
examining which types of households choose to maintain mortgage debt and which 
choose to pay it off and whether there are long-tem1 implications associated with the 
deci sion. These contradictions and missing aspects of the current literature regarding 
household leverage via mortgage debt highlight the importance of empirical analysis 
of the household leverage decision . 
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This study examines the characteristics of leveraged and unleveraged 
households and estimates the long-tem1 financial consequences of maintaining or 
eliminating mortgage debt. Based on the findings of this research, general 
recommendations to consumers may be made based on the experiences of consumers 
in general, rather than derived from spec ific or hypothetical scenarios or case studies 
in which the variability of the situation and outcome are controlled . The findings of 
this study may also have implications regarding the appropriateness of the current tax 
code which provides households with an incentive to hold mortgages over other forms 
of debt , and makes limi ted di st inction between mortgages used to purchase or 
improve a home and mortgages used to leverage a financial portfolio or increase 
current consumption. 
Trends in Mortgage Debt 
For many Americans, home ownership is considered a fundamental part of the 
American Dream. The Census Bureau reported that 66.2% of U.S. households, or 
approximately 69.8 million households, owned their home in 2000 (United States 
Census Bureau, n.d.). Home ownership rates have generally been climbing over the 
past two decades, and the current home ownership rate follows that same trend . 
Efficient cred it markets are advantageous to consumers, allowing them to shift 
reso urces between periods by borrowing in order to smooth their consumption over 
time. Modem mortgage finance in the Uni ted States, which allows individuals to 
borrow large amounts of money and repay it over several decades, is a resu lt of 
utiliz ing the effici ency of secondary financial markets through the sale of mortgage-
backed securities. For the average household, these market effic iencies make home 
ownership possible. At the close of2001, total mo1 gage debt in the United States 
was approximately $5.4trillion and total consumer debt was $1.7 trillion. To give 
some perspective to these amoun ts, total cOivorate debt in the United States at the end 
of2001 was $4.8 trillion (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2003). 
As the number of home owners has increased, aggregate mortgage debt, or 
money borrowed against the value of an ind ividua l's residence, has also increased. 
Not on ly has aggregate mortgage debt increased, bu t the proportion of households 
with mortgage debt has also increased. ln 1992, only 39.1% of households had any 
mortgage debt. By 2001 thi s number had risen to 44.6%, an increase of 14.1 %. 
Mortgage debt during the same peri od, measured in 200 1 dollars, increased from 
$3.57 trillion in 1992 to $5.39trillion in 2001, or 50.9% (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2003). Home ownership over the same time period 
increased only 6.0%, which is less than hal f the rate of growth in households with 
mortgage debt, suggesting that a greater proportion of households were borrowing via 
mortgage debt (Aizcorbe, Kenni ckell, & Moore, 2003). Yelde (2002) noted that the 
increase in household debt has been accompanied by an increase in household assets, 
suggesting that households may be purchasing assets with a portion of their 
borrowings, or household assets are ri sing independent of household debt as a resul t 
of the strong economy during the 1990s. 
Borrower incentives 
During the late 1990s and earl y years o f the 2000s, mortgage interest rates 
were at or near historical lows. These low interest rates provided consumers with 
ample incentives to refinance existi ng mot1gage loans or take on new mortgages. 
Home owners not only benefi tted from low interest rates during the 1990s, they also 
benefitted from significant apprec iati on ofhome values which resu lted in large 
increases in home equity. The combination of low interest rates and rapid 
appreciation of home values led many home owners to cash out some of their equity 
through refinancing, additional mortgages, or home equity lines of credit. By 
refinancing, home owners could potentially cash-out some of their accumulated equity 
and simul taneously lower their monthly paymen t (Coy & Keenan, 2003). 
As Velde (2002) suggested, some of the money obtained through refinancing 
and lower monthly payments was likely used to purchase assets. Another asset likely 
invested in, but not accounted for directly, is human capital resulting from education, 
relocation, and additional job training. IJ1 addit ion to accum ulating assets, much of the 
cashed-out equity was consumed. Economic observers noted that the recent economic 
4 
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down tum was mitigated by strong consumer spending, as a resu lt of liquidating home 
equity. In 2002, approx imately $200 billion was generated from cash-out refinancing, 
$350 billion (net of mortgage repayment) from equity conversion through home sales, 
and $ 130 billion from home equity lines of cred it (Greenspan, 2003). Greenspan 
reponed that approximately half of the $200 billion obtained from cash-out 
refinancing was invested in th e borrower's residence or other investments. 
Jn addition to the incent ive of low interest rates, the tax system in the United 
States a llows households that itemize their deductions to include mortgage interest in 
their income tax deduction calculation. Mortgage interest is deductible when the 
household has itemized deduct ions in excess of the standard deduction . According to 
the Un it ed States Department of the Treasury (1 996), 30% of households itemized 
their deducti ons in 1996 and potentially rece ived a tax benefit from mortgage interest 
ded ucti ons. For those who itemize, thi s deduction reduces the after-tax cost of 
mortgage debt by the amount of excess deduction resulting from the mortgage interest 
multip li ed by the borrower' s marginal tax rate. This has the potential of creati ng an 
artifici a ll y low cost of debt for some households. This favorable tax treatment of 
mortgage interest encourages households to hold more mortgage debt than they 
otherwise would . Consequently, many households have reallocated their debt 
portfolios to increase their mortgage debt and reduce other forms of debt (Dunsky & 
Follain, 2000; Stango, 1999). However, th e trading of unsecured for secured debt may 
make households more vulnerable to changes in income and consequently the risk of 
foreclosure and possibly bankruptcy (Su llivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000). 
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Nonetheless, some financial planners argue that households should strongly 
consider carrying a mortgage and invest any add itional money-that would otherwise 
be paid towards earl y reti rement of the loan- in investments that yi eld a higher after-
tax rate ofretum than the interest rate paid on the mortgage after taxes (Edelman, 
200 1; Johnston, 2000; Storms, 2000). This would enhance the fi nancial wealth of 
individuals and in tum may increase the ir overa ll life ti me consumption. This strategy 
is not wi thout ri sk, since investment ret ums are uncertain while mortgage payments 
are certain. Furthermore, mortgages are generall y secured by the individual 's primary 
residence, making the choice to carry a mortgage for investment purposes a 
potentiall y emotional decision. 
Recommendmions by Financial Professionals 
Financial planners appear to be divided regarding the use of mortgages to 
leverage households. Many feel that households should not carry mortgages into 
retirement while others persuasively argue that even households in retirement would 
be well -served by utilizing mort gages to tap into their home equity and obtain low-
cost investment capital to diversify their assets (Edelman, 2001 ; Johnston, 2000; 
Stom1s, 1996, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002). Financial authors readily acknowledge that 
the household 's decision to carry mortgage debt is also affected by the household 's 
attitude towards ri sk and debt. 
Household debt and access to credit create a choice for consumers regarding 
how resources are saved for future periods such as retirement. For households that 
currently carry a mortgage, unleveraging themselves, or paying off mortgage debt 
ahead of scheduled payments, is an effective method of saving for consumption in 
future periods. The rate of retum eamed on the money used to prepay the debt equals 
the interest rate charged on the borrowed funds. Many households choose to become, 
or remain , unleveraged, or debt-free. According to the 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (The Federal Reserve Board , 2003), 21 % of households with fixed rate 
mo11gages are ahead of their mortgage amorti zation schedule (author's calculations). 
On the other hand , households may choose to carry mortgage debt, or leverage 
themselves, so that they can have greater investment capital or a more diversified 
portfolio. These households choose not to prepay mongages, but rather make 
minimum payments on the loan or increase their ctment mongage, to take advantage 
of low-cost investment capital and to potentially increase their portfolio 's 
diversification. These households use tax-advantaged mortgage debt to leverage and 
diversify their assets in the hopes of realizing greater financial retums. 
When evaluating the choice to leverage or unleverage an individual's assets 
wi th a mortgage, a common and popular comparison used is the historical retum on 
equ ity investments versus the investor ' s current interest rate on their mortgage. While 
this is a convenient comparison, most investors experience rates of retum below 
historica l market rates ofretum, nullifying th e appropriateness of this comparison 
(Dalbar, Inc., 200 I). 
According to a recent study by Dalbar, Inc. (as cited in Clements, 2004), the 
average annual return on equity mutual funds for the 19 years ending December 2002 
7 
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was I I .8%. However, over that same period the average amJUal return realized by 
equity mutual fund in vestors was only 2.6%. The reason cited for this large disparity 
was mutual fund owners' relatively short holding period of the mutual funds, 
approximately 2.6 years. Dalbar, lnc. (2001) suggested that mutual fund investors 
appeared to be switching between funds frequently, rather than employing a long-term 
buy-and-hold strategy. However, Dalbar's findings may be subject to debate. 
Clements pointed out a bias in Dalbar's methodology which, when corrected, 
increased annual investor returns to 8.2% and reduced the gap between actual investor 
returns and the markets perforn1ance to 3.4 percentage points. Under the revised 
methodology, individual investors appeared to perform better, yet sti ll lagged behind 
the overall market. 
Compari sons using the hi storical rate of return in the equ ity market to current 
mortgage rates are also inappropriate because the average investor does not allocate 
100% of their portfolio to stocks. Waggle and Johnson (2003) examined optimal 
portfolio allocations using a mean variance analysis and expected utility model and 
found th at the optimal pot1folio allocation for moderately ri sk-averse households with 
signifi cant mortgage debt does not include a substantia l allocation to stocks. For 
househo lds wi th a high loan to va lue ratio and relatively modest financial asset 
holdings, optimal portfolios included as little as I 2% equity allocation. 
Historical rates of return on equities, such as those published by Ibbotson 
Associates (2002), are calculated using broad market indices based on a buy-and-hold 
strategy. Given the major difference between mutual fund investors' behavior and the 
method for calcul ating hi storical rates of retum, it does not seem appropriate for 
individ ual investors to use his torica l rates of return on equ ities to compare mortgage 
prepayment versus investing- unless the in vestor has consistently used a buy-and-
hold strategy and invested the majority of hi s or her assets in a market representative 
portfolio of equities . 
Signifi cance of the Study 
Consumers looking for financ ial advice regarding mortgage debt and 
household leverage find contradicting opinions on how and when it should be used. 
F inancia l writers' and planners ' clashing opinions have left consumers with no clear 
consensus on the appropriate cou rse of acti on. Financi al writers and planners have 
exp lored thi s topic wi th a vari ety of analyses and perspectives, including bootstrap 
modeling, case studies, and hypothetical scenarios (Goff & Cox, 1998; Palmer, 2002; 
Storn1s, 1996, 2000; Tomlinson, 2002). However, these approaches fail to add ress the 
long- tenn consequences of using mortgages on primary res idences for leverage 
because they ignore actual household behavior. These methods also fail to provide a 
means for retrospective analysis of the decision. 
Empirical studies are necessary to examine how househo lds behave wi th 
regard to househo ld leverage, and which alternatives provide the household with the 
greatest economic well-being. There is an absence of empi rical studies examining 
which types of households leverage themselves and how effective these households 
are in achieving greater financial retums. Furthennore, general recommendations to 
9 
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consumers may best be made based on the experiences of consumers in general, and 
not derived from specific hypothetical scenarios and case studies, which limit the 
variabi lity of the individual's environmeni. These shortcomings in the current 
literature regarding household leverage th rough mortgage debt underscore the need for 
empirical analysis of the household leverage decision. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the Jong-tenn relation between 
household leverage, through the use of mortgages, and changes in household wealth . 
The results of this study will support or refute current positions regarding household 
leverage via mortgages. The findin gs will also have implications for the current tax 
code which provides households an incent ive to hold mortgages over other forms of 
debt and makes limited distinction between mortgages used to purchase or improve a 
home, to leverage a financia l portfolio, or increase current consumption. 
The speci fie objectives of this study are: 
I . To compare and contrast the characteristi cs (i.e., debt, assets, income, 
portfo lio allocation, and demographics) of leveraged households (househo lds 
wit h mortgage debt) and unleveraged households (households without 
mortgage debt) in I 992 and 2002, 
2. To iden tify factors contributing to the change in the household 's assets and 
total resources during the period from 1992 to 2002, and 
3. To discuss the general implications of mongage debt for consumers, 
fina ncial professionals, educators, and tax policymakers. 
II 
A review of lit erature was conducted and appropriate theories and findings are 
identified and discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 develops a theoreti ca l and conceptual 
model for the ana lysis and also identifies the empirical model used for data analysis. 
The data for this study was the 1992 through 2002 data sets of the Health and 
Retirement Study. Chapter 4 discusses the resu lts of the empiri cal analysis and 
Chapter 5 di scusses the resu lts and implications that can be drawn from them. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVJEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoreti cal Research 
12 
The review of literature is divided into two main sections. The first secti on 
inc ludes theoretical research addressing why people save and accumulate resources 
and the concept of financial leverage. The second sec tion discusses empirica l 
research find ings regarding the accumulat ion of and changes in wealth, household 
borrowing behavior, and household response to tax incentives. The theoretical and 
empirica l findings will lead into hypotheses regarding whether households e ffectively 
use tax-advantaged mortgage debt in order to ach ieve greater resources avail able for 
consumption. 
Life Cycle Income Hypothesis 
How and why households save has long been a central point of interest among 
economists because individual savings yield aggregate savings which fom1 s the 
supply of capita l, and hence contributes vi tally to an economy's producti vity 
(Modigl iani, 1986). Current theori es on savings behavior begin with Keynes (1965) 
who orig in all y hypothesized: 
The fu ndamental psychological law .. is that men are disposed, as a 
rule and on average, to increase their consumption as their income 
increases, but not as much as the increase in their income (p. 96). 
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According to Modigliani (1986), the prevailing motive to save a ponion of 
income under Keynes' theory was to enable the indi vidual to bequeath an estate to hi s 
or her heirs. Keynes' theory, f01malized as the Consumption Function, does well in 
exp laining the differences between the savings rate of similar families with different 
incomes. However, as Bryant (1990) pointed out, it fails to explain the consistency of 
the national savings rate during periods of substant ial real income growth. 
As a result of the Consumption Function's shoncomings, new theories were 
introduced. In 1949, Duesenberry introduced what came to be known as the Relative 
Income Hypothesis. Duesenberry hypothesized that consumption is detem1ined 
largely by the behavior of one's soc ial c lass and that as real incomes increase, 
individua l social c lass also increases, resulting in greater expenditures to matc h one's 
peers in the newly-atta ined social circle. Later, Friedman (1957) introduced the 
Pem1anent Income Hypothesis, while at the same time, Modigliani and Brumberg 
(1954) introduced the found ation of the life cycle income hypothesis. The Pennanent 
Income Hypothesis and the life cycle income hypothesis are very similar regarding 
savings and consumption. The key difference between the two is that Friedman based 
his model on income in perpetuity, or an indefini te life span, with the corpus goi ng to 
th e individual's heirs, while Modigliani and Brumberg's life cycle income hypothesis 
is based upon the assumption that consumption and saving behavior are based on the 
resources available during the life span and th erefore the income available for 
consumption !lowing from those resources is finite and exhausted over the life span 
(Modigliani, 1986). 
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According to the life cycle income hypothesis (Ando & Modigliani, 1963) 
individuals seek to smooth their consumpt ion over their life by borrowing and saving 
at different stages of the life cycle, thus affecting the househo ld 's current portfolio of 
assets, debts, and net worth. The fundamen tal idea of the life cycle income hypothesis 
is that individuals base their consumption on total life resources and not on current 
income. Total resources include current net worth, current income, and the present 
va lue of future earned income. From these resources, a pennanent income flow is 
estimated and the individual's consumpti on, a proxy for utility or sat isfaction, is based 
on this permanent flow of income. As mentioned above, Friedman's (1957) 
Perrnanent Income Hypothesis treated permanent income as the income that could be 
generated indefinitely from the stock of resources, whereas Modigli ani and 
Brumberg's (1954) life cycle income hypothesis treated pennanent income more 
along the lines of an annuitized income stream that could be generated from the stock 
of total life resources for a finite life span. 
Hanna, Fan, and Chang (1995), used the life cycle income hypothesis to 
hypothetically model household consumption and net worth over the adult years. 
Under circumstances of rising real income, their model predicted that rational 
consumers wou ld borrow to increase consumption in early years, repay the borrowed 
funds, and then accumulate wealth. Hanna et al. made the simplifying assumption that 
individuals can borrow and save at the same interest rate. Modigliani (1986) also 
points to the "hump shape" of wealth accumulation based on the life cycle income 
hypothesis, namely that households borrow, save, and spend down wea lth during 
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retirement. One result of this hump shape of wealth is that individuals will have debt 
at a time when they begin saving. lfthe interest rate on debt and savings is the same, 
as is the case in Hanna and colleagues' (1995) model, then it makes no difference 
whether the ind ividual saves through debt repayment or through separate savings. 
Modigliani does not focus on the cost of debt in his discussion, only the real interest 
rate on savings, hypothesi zing that it may have no effect on the savings of individuals, 
or will encourage them to postpone some consumption now for greater consumpt ion 
in th e future resulting from the positive savings rate. 
In reality, individuals face a multitude of interest rates when borrowing and 
saving and often find that, as a result, there is a difference in the rate at which funds 
can be borrowed, and saved or invested. The differences in interest rates may lead 
individuals to simultaneous borrowing and saving, by maintaining relatively low-cost 
debt and saving transitory income (the difference between current income and 
permanent income) in higher yielding accounts. 
Financial Leverage 
The idea of creat ing wealth through borrowi ng at low interest rates and 
invest ing at higher rates ofretum has been ex tens ive ly exp lored in corporate finance 
literature. Financ ia l leverage, or the amount of debt fi nancing re lative to assets, has 
been thought to boost the profitability and the residual worth of corporations . 
Generally speaking, investors demand a higher rate of retum on stocks than they do on 
corporate bonds because stockholders are the last ones to get paid in good and bad 
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times. Bondholders always come first. Because bondholders require a lower rate of 
retum, in the past there was a consensus among financial researchers and 
professiona ls that some debt, due to its lower cost, made good business sense (Myers, 
2001 ). However, about the same time that Modigli an i was fomlU lating the life cyc le 
income hypothes is, he and Merton Miller published The Cost of Capital, C01porate 
Finance, and the TheOIJ' of Investment (1958) which changed the way economists 
thought about debt-enhancing corporate wealth. 
Modig li ani and Miller ( 1958) showed that the value of a corporation is 
independent of how the corporation is financed. Based on the assumption of perfect 
cap it al markets, they showed that the corporation's total value is based on its assets ' 
underlying value, which equals the sum value of all of its outstanding securities. The 
proportion of debt to equi ty financing is iiTelevant to the business' value. Modigliani 
and Mi ller showed that if a corporation were to issue debt, then the market would 
d iscount the corporation's stock because bond ho lders ' payments (interest and 
principa l) would take precedence over payments to stock holders. Modigliani and 
Mill er showed that the discount placed on the stock, e.g., the higher rate of return 
demanded by the stockholders, was equal to the savings resulting from the lower-cost 
debt. This net effect resulted in no change in the total val ue of the corporation. 
ln spite ofModigl ian i and Miller's (1958) findings , the debate over optimal 
amounts of debt and equi ty in corpo rate fi nance continues mainly because 
imperfections ex ist in the capita l markets. The original theory ass umed imperfections 
do not exist. Modigliani and Miller noted that when the tax code is taken into 
consideration, some exploitation can be achieved through an optimal balance of debt 
and equity. However, they concluded that the benefi t is minimal. 
Tradeoff Theory 
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Myers (2001) reviewed the three main theories (tradeoff, pecking order, and 
free cash now) relating fim1 value with its capital structure. Only the tradeofftheory 
is relevant to this research. The tradeoff theory takes into account the fact that the tax 
code allows corporations to deduct in terest payments as a cost of doing business. The 
value of debt is equal to the present value of the future stream of payments assoc iated 
wi th it. If a corporation were to maintain the same level of debt indefinitely, then the 
deb t's va lue is equal to the presen t val ue of the interest payments discounted at the 
debt's coupon interest rate (Modigli ani & Miller, I 958) . Since the interest is tax-
deductible, and assum ing the marginal tax rate of the corporation is 35%, the aft er-tax 
costs of the interest paym ents are p(J - 0. 35) where p is the payment. The value of the 
debt then fa ll s to D(J- 0.35). Myers il lustrates the potential va lue of this tax savings 
to shareholders by showing that if a corporation borrows $1 million, with the intent to 
hold the debt indefinit ely, and repurchases outstanding stock worth $1 million, then 
the value of the corporation has not changed. However, if the interest on the debt is 
tax-ded uctib le then the debt 's cost to the corporati on is only $650,000, and the stock 
and bondholders of the corporation have received an increase in thei r hold ings' value 
of $350,000. 
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Based on this illustration, tradeoff theory states, "that the fim1 will borrow up 
to the point where the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just offset by 
the increase in the present value of possible costs of financial distress" (Myers, 2001, 
pp. 88-89). ln other words, the corporation wi ll borrow to the point that the financial 
risks associated with debt, such as bankruptcy and higher required rates of return by 
stockholders, equal the benefits gai ned. 
individuals likewise reap benefits from borrowed funds, mongage debt in 
panicular, and can also experience financial distress, such as foreclosure and 
bankruptcy (Sullivan et al. , 2000). There are limited theoretical or empirical studies 
directly related to individual capital structure, or the combinat ion of personal savings 
and borrowed money, and wealth creation. However, several st udies have exam ined 
how ri sk tol erance and other household characteristics affect wealth accumulation, 
what types of consumers have a greater tendency to incur debt, and how households 
respond to changes in the tax code regard ing interest deductions. 
Empirical Research 
Wealth 
A household's ponfolio of assets and debts changes over the life cycle. 
Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997) analyzed changes in househo ld wea lth to 
detem1ine what factors were most influential. They found that age, income, initial 
wealth, receiving an inheritance, having a regular savings plan, and living in a 
metropol itan area were statistically significant positi ve indicators of changes in 
wea lth. IJ1 ord er to maintain an exogenous relationship between initi al wea lth and 
changes in household wealth , the researchers used the household 's wealth percentile 
in place of actual initial measu res of wealth, which would be part oft he independent 
variable. 
The authors acknowledged that thei r model only accounted for. 4 to 6% of the 
variab ility in changes in weal th . Similar to other studies, Kennickell and Starr~ 
McCluer (1 997) found that households' behavior was consistent with the life cycle 
hypothesis: debt was most frequen tly incurred among yo ung households, and then 
eliminated among middle-aged households. Net worth also appeared to peak around 
age 55 and then declined for o lder age ~,'Toups . However, the decline was relatively 
small. 
Health 
Recent research on the relation between health and wealth has high lighted a 
strong correlation between the two (Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, & Ribeiro, 
2003; Grossman, 1973; Meer, Miller, & Rosen, 2003). An early study by Grossman 
found that differences in se lf-reported health were inversely related to the number of 
work weeks missed. The lost productivity resu lted in an immediate loss in wages. 
Poor hea lth also decreased the cumulative experience, training, and working years; 
thus, diminishing human wealth (Bryant, 1990). 
Meer et al. (2003), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
instrumen tal variab le methodologies, showed that the dominant path is from health to 
wealth rather than from weal th to health, especially over short term periods. A 
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stati sti call y significant relati on from wealth to health was also found. However, the 
magnitude of the effect was very small and when the effect was controlled for through 
instrumental variables, it was no longer statisticall y significant. 
Adams et al. (2003) al so arrived at similar conclusions using the Asset and 
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD). They found no evidence between 
wealth and mortality or the sudden onset of acute disease. However, there was . 
evidence that wealth affected the incidence of menta l and psychological problems. 
Findings regarding wealth and chron ic and other illnesses were mixed. Adams et al. 
did find evidence of a causa l link from health conditions to total wealth changes. The 
effect of health on wea lth appears to be cons istently established in the lit erature, while 
the effect of wea lth on hea lth , result s in insignificant, mixed, or unsubstanti al effects. 
Portfolio AllocGfion 
Spencer and Fan (2002) suggested that a househo ld 's wi llingness to incur debt 
is dependent upon its risk tolerance. Risk tolerance is also an important aspect of 
wea lth accum ulat ion because it is a major determ inant of how an individual' s 
portfolio is allocated among different assets, and thus determines the assets' rate of 
retum (G utter, 2000) . Historically, stocks have experienced rates of return 
approximately twice as high as bonds and a greater allocation towards stocks would 
likely result in greater overa ll returns (Ibbotson Associates, 2002). Several stud ies 
have examined the det erminants of risk tolerance (Grable & Lytton, 1998; Schooley & 
Worden, 1996; Sung & H anna, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). 
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The most consistent household and demographic factors that are positively 
associated with risk tolerance are net worth, education, being married, being non-
Hispanic White, and not being retired (Grable & Lytton, 1998; Schooley & Worden, 
1996; Sung & Hanna, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). Other less-consisten t factors 
positively associated with risk tolerance included being self-employed and male 
(Grable & Lytton; Sung & Hanna). Income was only found to be a statistically 
significant factor in Grab le and Lytton's study. Health was negatively correlated with 
risk tolerance and was only included in Wang and Hanna's model. 
The effect of risk tolerance and portfolio allocation on wealth accumulation is 
most eviden t in Gutter's (2000) st udy. Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
Gutter classi lied households as either willi ng or unwilling to take investment risk. 
Households that were willing to take financial ri sks were found to have approximately 
3.5 times higher net worth than households not willing to take investment risks. 
Gutter a lso classifi ed households based on whet her they owned risky assets. Gutter 
(2000) defined risky assets to be items such as "ownership of stocks or small 
businesses" (p. 13). Households that owned risky assets had an average net worth 5 
times greater than households that did not own risky assets . 1 tests comparing the 2 
groups showed statistica ll y signifi can t differences with p < 0.0001. Gutter's findings, 
while cross-sectional, provide strong evidence that a household's risk tolerance and 
portfolio al location are influential factors affect ing wealth accumulation. 
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lmergenerationa/ Transfers 
Kotlikoffand Summer's (1981) work argued that the stock of U.S. wealth 
resulting from intergenerational transfers, name ly inheritances and bequests, 
rep resen ted the majority of assets held by U.S. households. They estimated that 80% 
of the stock of U.S. wealth was a result of inheritances from older gen_erations, whi le 
on ly 20% was accounted for by current savings consistent with the life cycle income 
hypothesis. Modigliani (1986) argued that the amount is much less, and based on a 
survey of research results estimates the amount of bequeathed wealth at no more than 
25% of househo lds' asset holdings. Modigliani was also critical of Kotlikoff and 
Summer's methods and suggests that when estimation errors were corrected, Kot li koff 
and Summer's resu lts were consisten t with the 25% figure . Regardi ng either fi gure, 
the percent of households ' assets attributable to bequests were substanti al. 
Using the Asset and Health Dynamics Survey, McGarry and Schoeni ( 1997) 
found evidence supponing the altruism theory of fam ili al transfers proposed by 
Becker ( 198 1 ). McGarry and Schoeni found that less well-off children were more 
likely to receive a transfer from their parents and that the amount of the transfer was 
larger than transfers to better-off siblings. No ev idence was found in the study 
supponing exchange th eory. 
McGarry (1999) also found that transfers made by parents when li vi ng, were 
disproponionately made to less well-off children, however, bequests made at death 
were regularly d istributed equally among all children. McGarry proposed that living 
transfers were made based on the chi ld 's current income, whereas bequests at death 
were made based on the child's pennanent income. Chang (2004), summari zing 
current literature regarding intergenerati ona l transfers also notes that inter-vivos 
transfers were unequally di stributed among children whil e bequests at death were 
equally di stributed, consistent with McGmry's conclusions. Chang also noted a 
common finding was that the recipient's earn ings and transfers were positively 
related. This common finding provides no support for Becker 's (1981) Rotten Kid 
Theorem. 
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Consistent with Chang's (2004) summary, Kao, Hong, and Widdows (1997) 
found that individuals who had more education were more likely to expect to receive 
an inheritance. lndividuals who were married, Whi te, with living parents, and 
reporting higher re lative health were also more likely to expect to receive an 
inheritance. On the other hand, individuals w ith large non-liquid holdings, who were 
middle-aged, marri ed, and had fewer chi ldren had higher expectations of bequeathing 
assets. 
Borrower Characrerisrics 
While interest rates, asset prices, and tax incentives affect the household's 
willingness to botTow, other demographic factors are also important. Households with 
outstanding debt were more likely to be single-headed households, younger, non-
White, home owners, employed, have less fonnal education, higher income, lower net 
worth, and larger household sizes (Chen & Jensen, 1985; Crook, 2001; Salandro & 
Harrison, 1997; Spencer & Fan, 2002; Zhu & Meeks, 1994). Maki (1995) had similar 
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results except that married household and more educated households were more likely 
to carry greater amounts ofmongage debt. The finding that debt declines later in life 
is consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis and is also found in studies 
examining household debt holdings. Zhu and Meeks, using the 1983 to 1986 panel 
data of the Survey of Consumer Finances, found that employment and educational 
attainmen t were positively associated with outstanding credit balances while age was 
negatively associated wi th outstanding debt. 
Spencer and Fan (2002) examined simultaneous debtors and savers and their 
saving motives. Using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, Spencer and Fan 
report that 54.7% of their sample were simultaneo us debtors and savers . 
Approximately 40% of simultaneous debtors and savers reported a savings motive 
consistent with the Ii fe cycle income hypothesis. An additional 33 .7% of 
simultaneous debtors and savers have precautionary savings motives. Precautionary 
savings are for emergencies, iII ness, or unemployment. Precautionary savings are not 
incorporated into the life cycle income hypothesis in a direct sense. However, in the 
sense that o ld age brings about unemployment (retirement), illness, and unexpected 
expenses, these costs are included indirectly as one ages, but not for younger 
households. 
Other studies have focused specifically on households that borrow against the 
value of their home. Househo lds most likely to use home equity credit lines are 
middle-aged and younger, have larger household size, shoner ownership tenure, fewer 
assets and lower net wonh, and lower income (Chen & Jensen, 1985; Salandro & 
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Harrison, 1997). Chen and Jensen also noted that the combination o f being single and 
ret ired is stat isti cally signi ficantly related to home equity use, whil e non-retired 
households were more li kely to use home equ ity if they were marri ed. Also, low-
income(< $ 12,500, 1983 do ll ars) and high-income (> $25,000, 1983 doll ars) famili es 
were more likely to use home equ ity compared to middle-income households. Chen 
and Jensen speculated that low-income households use home equi ty out of need, 
whereas high-income households were more risk tolerant and therefore ut ili zed home 
equ ity for consumpt ion convenience. Sa landro and Harrison also found income 
statisti ca ll y signifi cant but d id not control fo r a curvili near relati onship . In their study, 
the amount of home equity was statistically sign ifi cant and the interest rate was 
ins igni fica nt , whil e Chen and Jensen did not cont ro l fo r interest rates. Consistent in 
both studies was that higher levels of net wo rt h were associated with lower levels of 
home equity use. 
Jones (1 996) found that home equ ity was consumed by the elderl y as a last 
resource. This is consistent with Chen and Jensen's (1 985) finding that retired 
indiv iduals uti lized home equi ty after becoming single. Moreover, liquidity 
constraints were not a facto r in the use of home equity (Chen & Jensen; Jones). 
Household Demographics 
Key demographic variab les, such as marital status and race have been 
ident ifi ed by researchers as in Ouenti al detenninants of the household 's risk tolerance, 
the propensity to borrow, and wea lt h ho ldings. Marital status is an important 
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demograph ic vari ab le to control, because of the greater human capital resulting from 
two adults (Bryant, 1990). Retirement savings studies have also documented the 
differences in wealth accumulation between man·ied and single househo lds (Mitchell, 
Moore, & Phillips, 2000; Moore & Mitchell , 2000; Weir & Willis, 2000) and 
consistently show the negative economic effects of divorce. Marital status has also 
been found to affect risk tolerance (Grable & Lytton , 1998; Sung & Hanna, 1996; 
Wang & Hatma, 1997) as well as borrowing behavior (Chen & Jensen, 1985). 
Race has also been found to be correlated with risk tolerance (Grab le & 
Lytton, 1998; Sung & Hatma, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). Discrimination in the 
labor markets and the resulting negative feedback , also contributed to minority ethni c 
groups having lower incomes and often lower educat ion (Becker, 197 1). The 
diffi culties minorities experienced during their working years were reflected in their 
wealt h at retirement (Honig, 2000; Smith, 1995). Using the Health and Retirement 
Study data, Smith found that average and median wealth among White households 
was more than double the wealth among Black and Hispanic households. Honig' s 
findings are similar, and show large discrepancies in the amount of wealth 
accumulated between different racial/ethnic groups . 
Household Portfolio Response to Taxation 
The 1986 Tax Refonn Act (TRA) provided researchers w ith the opportunity to 
investigate household behavior in relation to taxes and debt. Prior to 1986, 
households could deduct interest expenses on all consumer debts, including credit 
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cards, auto loans, and mortgages. The 1986 TRA phased out the deductibility of non-
mortgage interest payments, signifi cantly lowered the marginal tax brackets for 
individuals, and increased the standard deduction (Stango, 1999). After the Act 
passed, Stango examined how households responded to the phase-out of interest 
deductions on non-mortgage debt. Us ing aggregate times series data from 1980 
through !991 , Stango estimated that by 1991 cred it card and auto loan debt were 
approximatel y 14% and 9% below what they would have been in the absence of the 
tax law change, respectively. Total mortgage debt however, was approximately I% 
higher than it wou ld have been. When examining aggregate mortgage debt, the effects 
of interest rates and housing prices dominated the effect of preferential tax treatment 
and were controll ed for in Stango's mode l. The per capi ta income and average 
marginal tax rate were also stati sti cally significant variables in the estimated model. 
Based on anecdotal evidence at the time, Stango believed that much of the debt 
shuffling from non-deductib le to deductible forms of debt was facilitated through the 
use of home equity credit lines. 
Dunsky and Follain (2000) also examined the effects of the 1986 TRA using 
the Survey of Consumer Finances 1983 to 1989 panel data series and found evidence 
of portfolio reshuffling based on tax law changes. Dunsky and Fo ll ain argued that 
because the standard deduction increased as pari of the 1986 TRA, the after-tax cost of 
mortgage debt also increased because the marginal benefit to itemizing households 
decreased. This was not accounted for in Stango's (1999) analysis. Dunsky and 
Follain found that business owners were less sens itive to increases in the cost of 
mortgage debt compared to non-business owners . 
Supporting these findings, Crook (2001) found that the maximum household 
debt load was observed at incomes of $151 ,461, wh ich was less than the previously 
observed relation in 1983 of$173,8 11. One explanation for this is that the after-tax 
cost of debt increased between 1983 and 1995 as a result of the 1986 TRA 's 
provisions, namely, lower marginal tax rates and increased standard deductions. In 
response to the TRA, as Dunsky and Follain (2000) point out, households reduced 
their overall demand for debt. 
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In a similar study, Maki (1995, 1996), using successive waves of the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey and panel tax return data, found that portfolio shufning 
to take advantage of the 1986 tax law changes was not uniform across all households. 
He found that more educated high-income home owners were the only group to show 
clear evidence that deductible mortgage debt was substituted for non-deductible 
consumer debt after the 1986 TRA 's implementation. High-income home owners 
reduced the interest paid on consumer debt by 36%, whi le increasing the amount of 
interest paid on mortgage debt by 16% from 1987 to 1991. Furthermore, highly 
educated high-income renters did not show any evidence of portfolio shufning in 
response to the tax law change. In fact , they did not reduce their consumer debt 
holdings. 
One of the tools cited by Maki (1995) likely used to reallocate debt holdings 
was mortgage refinancing. However, other methods of extracting home equity may 
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also have been used, such as selling the home and reinvesting only part of the money 
into a subsequent home purchase (Engen & Gale, 1997). 
The 1986 TRA affected more than just the deductibility of interest debt, it also 
affected the deductibility of savings assoc iated with IRAs. New limits and restrictions 
were imposed on IRAs that made them comparatively less attractive than 401(k) 
plans. Engen and Gale (1997) found that this contributed to a sh ift in households' tax-
preferred asset holdings. Prior to the 1986 TRA, IRAs represen ted the majority of 
tax -preferred household assets. By 1992, IRAs only represented approximately one 
fifth of tax-preferred assets, while 40l(k) holdings accounted for three fourths of tax-
preferred holdings . 
Engen and Gale (1997) examined the interaction between househo ld debt and 
asset holdings subsequent to the 1986 TRA. They found that households who had at 
least one worker eligible to participate in a 401 (k) plan increased their financial asset 
holdings and accumulated more net financial assets than similar househo lds that did 
not participate in a 40l(k) plan. However, the net wealth (assets minus li abi lities) of 
these households was not greater than those who did not participate in a 40l(k) plan. 
The simil arity in net wealth, although net fin ancial assets were significantly different, 
is explained by the fact that 401 (k) plan participants had Jess home equity or greater 
li abilities relative to non-participants. When controlling for other factors , Engen and 
Gale found that households participating in 401 (k) plans, who also had access to tax-
advantaged mortgage debt, appeared to use tax-advantaged mortgage debt to increase 
their 40l(k) plan holdings. The increase in 40l(k) assets was offset by a decrease in 
home equity. These households appear to be maximizing the benefits allowed under 
the 1986 TRA by using tax-advantaged debt to invest in a tax-deferred asset, thereby 
reducing the effecti ve cost of taxes. 
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Maki (1996) noted that the U.S. Congress' policy goa ls have been frustrated to 
a large extent by the portfolio shuffling ofhigh-income home owners. With the 
passage of the 1986 TRA, Congress wanted to reduce the incentive to borrow for 
consumer purchases (thereby increasing the national savings rate) and to increase tax 
revenue by approxi mately $10 billion annua ll y by eliminating consumer interest as a 
deductible expense for income tax purposes. Apparently, households do adjust their 
holdings of assets and debts, in particular the type of ho lding, to maximize tax 
savings. However, tax incentives, or disincentives, assoc iated with some form s of 
debt do not appear to curtail consumpti on. 
Summary 
Several theories have been introduced to exp lain household sav ings and 
consumption behavior. The two most robust models of household savings are 
Friedman's Pem1anent Income Hypot hesis and Ando and Modigliani 's (1 963) life 
cyc le income hypothesis. The life cycle income hypothesis describes the household 's 
uti lity as a function of consumpt ion over the life span. Consumption in tum is then 
based on the availability of the househo ld 's total resources at any given time during 
the life span. The life cycle income hypothesis posits that young households and 
households, in which the majority of resources are in the forrn of human capi tal, incur 
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debt in order to consume. Later in life, the household pays off the debt and saves for 
the later years of life when relatively littl e human capi tal wil l remain and consumption 
wi ll be det ennined by the household's tangible assets. 
As a result of the househo ld having both debt and excess income for savings, 
the household must decide which fom1 of savings wi ll maximize futur_e period 
consumption- pay down the debt or accumulate the savings in a separate accou!lt. 
Some theori es, such as the tradeoff theory, suggest that low-cost, tax-advantaged debt 
shou ld be held or maintained rather than paid off. Such behavior would maximize the 
household 's total resources because the government, through favorable tax 
regul ati ons, wou ld pay for a por1ion of the interest expense and the household could 
use subsidized debt to invest in higher yielding investments. 
Studies examining household wealth have identified several factors that 
contribute to the household's abil ity to accumulate wealth. The age of the household 
(consisten t with the life cycle income hypothesis) the household ' s will ingness to take 
financ ial ri sks, intergenerati onal transfers in the fonn of bequests and inheritances, 
and hea lth status are all strong determ inants of the total wealth held by the household. 
IJ1come has also been found to affect wea lth accumulat ion; however, its effects are not 
consistent across stud ies . 
Household borrowing behavior has been found to be cons istent with the life 
cycle income hypothesis in that young households borrow more than older 
households, with debt peaking around middle age and then decreasing into old age. 
32 
There is some evidence of debt increasing again in old age, particularly housing debt, 
aft er other resources have been depleted. 
There is limited empirical lit erature regarding the relation of low-cost, tax-
advantaged household debt and changes in household wea lth, as suggested by the 
tradeoff theory. Such research wou ld fill in gaps in the current body of literature 
relating to wealth accumulation, the use of debt, and savings choices, and would 
contribute to clarifying the implications associated with leveraged household savings. 
Hypotheses 
The framework for this study was based on the review of literature relating to 
the theory and findings of recen t empirical research on wealth and debt holdings of 
households. Hypotheses are presented in the following sections based on the review 
of theoretical and empirical research. 
Household Leverage 
This research assumed the framework of the life cycle income hypothesis, in 
that households base consumption on the present val ue ofl ife resources availab le to 
them and seek to maximize utility across the life span by maximizing the value of li fe 
resources available for consumption subject to their constraints and preferences. For 
purposes of this study, total resources at a given point in time proxied life resources 
avai lable at that time. Based on the life cycle income hypothesis and the theoretical 
models derived in Chapter 3, households may benefit from carrying mortgaged debt 
assu ming the presence of other characteristics. However, without the other 
characteristics and assuming equal interest rates on debt and savings, negl igible 
differences in changes in wealth between househo lds carrying mortgage debt and 
those without mortgage debt should be observed. 
33 
Based on the tradeoff theory (Myers, 200 I), households may optimize the 
present value of thei r total resources by ut ilizing tax-advantaged debt to the extent that 
the amount did not create financial distress. Given thi s theoretical premise, a positive 
assoc iati on between mortgage debt and changes in wea lth should be observable. 
Continuing with the tradeoff theory, a concave relation between the square of initi al 
mortgage deb t and changes in weal th should also be observable as households take on 
excessive mortgage debt and experience financial di stress. 
A major limitat ion of appl ying the tradeoff theory to households was that 
household goals and business goals are very di fferent. To the extent that households 
use mortgage debt to leverage themselves fo r in vestment purposes, the tradeoff theory 
was applicable. However, if households used mortgage debt to supplement 
consumption, which, based on Greenspan's (2003) discussion many households did, 
tradeoff theory wo uld not be applicable. Mortgage debt would thus genera lly be 
negatively assoc iated with wea lth since the consumption comes with the additional 
interest cost. 
Given the sample restrictions used in th is study and based on the life cyc le 
income hypothesis and the tradeoff theory in the presence of taxes, the fo llowi ng 
hypo theses re lating to the household leverage ratio were proposed: 
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1.1 HA: Controll ing for other factors, the initia l household leverage ratio is 
positively associated wit h changes in assets and total resources. 
Based on the tradeoff theory, those households that maintained or increased 
financial leverage during the period of interest would be most likely to realize greater 
benefi ts of being leveraged. Thus, the foll owing hypotheses were proposed: 
2. 1 HA: Controlling for other factors , paying off mortgage debt , as 
compared to constantly unleveraged households, is negatively 
assoc iated wi th changes in assets and total resources. 
2.2 HA: Controlling for other factors, keeping or incurring mortgage debt, 
as compared to constantly unleveraged households, is positively 
assoc iated with changes in assets and total resources. 
The tradeoff th eory, as discussed by Myers (200 1), hypothesized that a 
business will take on debt so long as the benefits exceed the costs ofpotentia1 
financial distress . Similarly, households take on debt in order to increase consumption 
and shift resources between time periods. Generally, but not always, households will 
take on debt to the point that th e benefits of the debt exceed the psychological and 
financial burdens associated with it. Supporting thi s idea were Crook's (2001) 
fi ndings that the amount of debt demanded by households has a curvilinear 
relationship with income and beyond a certain income, the demand for debt decreases. 
et worth is also negati vely related to the amount of debt demanded (Crook) . Based 
on thi s premise, a curvilinear relation between financial leverage and wealth was 
hypothesized in th e fo llowing manner: 
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3.1 HA: Controlling for other factors, the square of the initial leverage ratio 
multiplied by I ,000 is negatively assoc iated with changes in assets and 
total resources. 
In come and Work 
The U.S. utilizes a progressive income tax structure so that higher income 
households pay taxes at higher rat es. As a result of this tax structure, higher marginal 
tax bracket households realize greater tax savings from interest deducti ons (Stango, 
1999). Consequen tly, households in higher marginal tax brackets have the potential of 
garnering the greatest benefits from leveraging themselves through mortgage debt. 
Maki (I 995) found evidence that only high-income, sophisticated households showed 
evidence of shuffling their debt holdings in response to tax Jaw changes. Households 
with greater income also tend to save more of their income, thus increasing their 
wea lth more than households with low incomes (Ke1mickell & Starr-McCluer, 1997). 
Participation in the labor market by households enables them to convert human 
capi tal into financial capital. Households with longer periods of participation, all 
other things equal, should have greater ability to convert human capital to financial 
capital. The following hypotheses are proposed regarding household income and 
trends in labor market participation: 
4.1 HA: Controlling for other factors, household income is positively 
related with changes in assets and total resources. 
5.1 a HA: Controlling for other factors , working in 1992 and not working in 
2002, as compared to working in 1992 and 2002, is positively related 
with changes in assets. 
5. 1 b HA: Contro lling for other factors , working in 1992 and not working in 
2002, as compared to work ing in 1992 and 2002, is ne~atively related 
with changes in assets .. 
5.2a HA: Controll ing for other factors , not worki ng in 1992 and working in 
200, as compared to households working in 1992 and 2002, is 
negat ively related with changes in assets. 
5.2b HA: Controlling for other factors , not working in 1992 and working in 
200, as compared to househo lds working in 1992 and 2002, is 
positively related with changes in assets. 
36 
5.3a HA: Controlling for other facto rs, not working in 1992 and not working 
in 2002, as compared to households working in 1992 and 2002, is 
negati vely related with changes in assets. 
5.3b HA: Controlling for other factors, not working in 1992 and not working 
in 2002, as compared to households working in 1992 and 2002, is 
positively related with changes in assets. 
Initial Wealth and Portfolio Allocation 
Changes in total resources, in part icu lar financial wealth, had a strong relation 
with the household 's in itial wealth standing and risk tolerance, or exposure to risky 
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assets (Gutter, 2000; Kennickell & Starr-McCluer, 1997). As Kennickell and Starr-
McCJuer found, higher initi al wea lth was positively associated wi th greater increases 
in wealth. If the percent change in wealth were measured, then lower leve ls of initial 
wea lth wou ld likely be associated with the greatest changes in wealth . Similar to the 
methodology used by Kennickell and Starr-McCJuer, initial wealth percentiles were 
used to control for init ial wealth holdings. The household's initial total resources 
were included. Human capital was not explicit ly included because it was already 
proxied by income, health status, and education . Ri sk tolerance was proxied by the 
household's allocation of its non-housing assets to ri sky assets (Friend & Blume, 
I 975; Gutter). Brinson, Singer, and Beebower (I 991) found that the allocati on of 
portfolio assets- between stocks, bonds, and cash- was far more important than timing 
and specific asset selection . Based on the empirical research the following 
hypotheses were proposed: 
6. I HA: Controlling for other factors, the househo ld ' s initi al level of total 
reso urces, compared to the 0 to 25'h percentile category, is positively 
related with changes in assets and total resources. 
7. I HA: Controlling for other factors, the initial ratio of ri sky assets to total 
non-housing assets is pos iti ve ly rel ated wi th changes in assets and total 
resources. 
Maki (1996) noted that the policy goals of the 1986 TRA were frustrated in 
large measure because households substituted mortgage debt for consumer debt. 
Usi ng mortgage proceeds to fi nance current consumption was an important 
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consideration in this research. ln order to proxy the household's preference to borrow 
for current consumption, the amount of other debt held (credit card debt, medical debt, 
and other personal loans) by the household was included and its relation to changes in 
wealth were hypothesized as follows : 
8.1 HA: Controlling for other factors, the amount of other debt is negat ively 
related to changes in assets and total resources . 
Inheritance 
Many households have bequest motives and thi s remains an important facto r 
in wealth accumulation and decumulation behaviors (Modigliani, 1986). Modigliani 
estimated that 20 to 25% of household wealth was a result of inheritances. Because of 
the impact bequests can have on changes in household wealth, receiving an 
inheritance and the likelihood of leaving a bequest were included in. the model. The 
fo llowing hypotheses regarding initial wealth ho ldings and bequests were proposed : 
9.1 HA: Controlling for other factors , receiving an inheritance, as compared 
to those households that did not receive an inheritance during the 
period of observation, is positive ly related to changes in assets and total 
resources. 
I 0. 1 HA: Controlling for other fac tors, expecting to leave a sizable estate, 
compared to not expecting to leave a sizab le estate, is positively related 
to changes in assets and total resources. 
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Heailh and Demographics 
Weal th was also affected by the hea lth status of the individual. Declines in 
hea lth statu s shortened ex pected working years as we ll as reduced the amount of work 
performed during wo rking years, reduc ing th e individual ' s human wealth, and thereby 
red ucing thei r total resources (Grossman, 1973). The following hypotheses were 
proposed regarding health: 
11.1 HA: Controlling for other factors, ini tial self-rated health is positively 
related to changes in assets and tota l resources . 
12 .1 HA: Contro lling for other fac tors, dec lines in self-rated health, as 
compared to those who maintained their health , is negatively related to 
changes in assets and total resources. 
12.2 HA: Controlling for other factors, improved self-rated health, as 
compared to those who maintained their health, is positively related to 
changes in assets and tot al resources. 
Household size was also included in the model to estimate the costs and 
resources avai lable to the household. Genera ll y, increases in the number of ad ults in 
the household increased its eaming capacity and thus available resources. On the 
other hand , increases in the number of chi ldren strained the household's resources and 
may have depleted assets (Bryant, 1990). Household size and changes in household 
size were included in the model with the following associated hypotheses: 
13. 1 HA: Cont roll ing for oth er factors, initial household size is negatively 
related to changes in assets and total resources. 
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14.1 HA: Controll ing for other factors, increases in the household size, as 
compared to households that remain the same size, is negative ly related 
to changes in assets and total resources. 
14.2 HA: Controlling for other factors , decreases in the household size, as 
compared to households that remain the same size, is positively related 
to changes in assets and total resources. 
Wealth accumulation patterns were a function of age, genera ll y increasing to a 
peak and then decreasing as the individual consumed accumulated wealth 
(Modigliani, 1986). Because of this, age was a key variable when modeling changes 
in wealth. The square of age was not included in this study because of the li mited 
span of ages included in the sample. Based on the life cycle income hypothesis, the 
following hypothesis was proposed: 
15.1 a HA: Controlling for other factors, age of the individual or oldest partner 
is positively related to changes in assets. 
15.1 b HA: Controlling for other factors, age of the individual or oldest partner 
is negatively related to changes in total resources . 
The household 's education level is also important. Maki (1996) found that 
more educated households with higher incomes were the only households that 
reshuffled their debt holdings to take advantage of potential benefits in the tax code. 
The combinations of mortgage debt and education and mortgage debt and income 
appear to be good indicators of the household's ability to capitalize on tax code 
benefits. As a result ofMaki's findings , the following was hypothesized regarding 
education and educated households' ability to successfu lly leverage themselves: 
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16.1 HA: Controlling for other factors , the highest year of schooling 
completed is positively related to changes in assets and total resources. 
Based on Maki 's (1995, 1996) findings , the interaction between mortgage debt 
and income and education was expected to be positive. Based on the idea of 
borrowing low-cost mortgage debt to invest in more profitable securities also implies 
that the interaction between the household ' s allocation of assets to risky investments 
and mongage debt was positive (Stonns, 1996; Tomlinson, 2002). Observed 
household bon·owing behavior is consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis, 
therefore, the combination of mortgage debt and age was also included in the model. 
The following hypotheses were proposed to model the interaction between mortgage 
debt, as measured by the household leverage ra tio, and its interaction with several 
variables. 
17.1 HA: Controlling for other factors , the combination of the highest year 
of schooling completed and the initial leverage ratio is positively 
related to changes in assets and total resources. 
18.1 HA: Controlling for other fac tors, the combination of household income 
in 1991 and the initial leverage ratio is positively related to changes in 
assets and total resources. 
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19. 1 HA: Controll ing for other fac tors, the combination of the ratio of risky 
investments to non-housing assets and the initial leverage ratio is 
positively related to changes in assets and total resources. 
20.1 HA: Contro ll ing for other fac tors, the combination of the age of the 
oldest household respondent and the in itial leverage ratio, is posi tively 
related to changes in assets and total resources. 
Demographic characteristics of househo lds were infl uenti al detenninants of 
ho useholds' ri sk tolerance, the propensi ty to borrow, and wealth holdings. Key 
demographic variab les, such as marital status and race, were selected and the 
fol lowing hypothesized relations were proposed: 
21.1 HA : Controlling fo r other factors, initi a lly single female households, as 
compared to married households, is negatively related to changes in 
assets and total resources. 
22.2 HA: Contro lling for other fac tors, ini tially single male households, as 
compared to married households, is negati vely related to changes in 
assets and total resources. 
23.1 HA: Contro lling fo r other factors, the household head being African 
American, as compared to non-Hispanic White household heads, is 
negati vely related to changes in assets and total resources. 
24.2 HA: Controlli ng for other factors, the household head being Hispan ic, 
as compared to non-Hispan ic Whi te household heads, is negati vely 
re lated to changes assets and total resources. 
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25.3 HA: Controlling for other factors, the household head being other, as 
compared to non-Hispanic Whi te household heads, is negatively related 
to changes in assets and total resources. 
Table 2.1 is a summary of the hypothesized relations, while controlling for 
other variables. 
Table 2.1 
Summary of Hypolheses for Changes in Asse1s and To1al Resources 
Variable 
Household leverage 
1992 debt ratio (x I 000) 
Change in ratio' 
Paid off 
Kept or borrowed 
1992 debt ratio squared 
Income and work 
1991 income (in OOOs) 
Work status (working to working') 
Working to not working 
Not working to working 
Not working to not working 
Ini tial wealth and portfolio 















Variable Assets Total resources 
75'h - 89'h + + 
90'h- IOO'h + + 
Risky assets to total assets + + 
1992 other debts (in OOOs) 
Inheritance 
Received inheri tance + + 
Leave estate (not likely') 
Defi nitely + + 
Probably + + 
Possibly + + 
Health 
1992 health (fa ir or poor') 
Exce ll ent + + 
Very good + + 
Good + + 
Change in hea lth (declined') 
No change + + 
Improved + + 
Demographics 
1992 household size 
Change in household size (constant') 
Increased 





Debt ratio X education 
Debt ratio X income 
Debt ratio X risk 
Debt ratio X age 
Coupled status (married') 
Single female 
Single male 





















The theoretica l rramework for this research was based on the life cycle income 
hypothesis fonnalized by Ando and Modigliani (1963) wi th insights gained frorn 
Modigli ani and Miller's (1958) work on corporate capital structure and the val ue of 
corporations. Ando and Modigliani 's mathematical model was adapted to describe 
consumpt ion over the life cycle and changes in total resources: 
C, = O ,V, [3.1] 
where C, represents the total consumption of goods and services in period t. Q, 
captures the characteristi cs of the individual, such as age, preference, and the rate of 
retum on investments, and is dependent upon the indi vidual's utility function . V, 
denotes the present va lue of resources ava ilable to the individual. V, can be expanded 
in a sim ilar manner to what is shown by Ando and Modigliani: 
N y 
V=A +Y+ "' I 
I 1-1 I ~ ( ) 11- 1 
I+ I I + r, 
[3.2] 
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where A,_1 captures the value of assets rema ining from the prior period avai lable for 
consumption in period 1. Y, is th e non-investment income in then'' peri od 1, and I: (YJ 
I (1 + rJ"-', summed from n = 1 + 1 to N, captures the present value of future non-
investment income in then'' period with an ea rn ings span of N years. The discount 
rate, r, used by Ando and Modigliani to calculate the present value of future labor 
earn ings is the real ra te of return on assets. 
Hanna et al. ( 1995) conducted their simulations under the assumption that the 
interest rate on debt equa led the rate of return on assets. Following this assumption, 
and allowing the household to borrow and invest the proceeds of the loan, 1, the 
resources remaining from the prior period are shown in equation 1.3. 
N }' 
v, =[(A,_, +1,_,)-I,_, ]+Y, +I --'-,-_, 
,. ,(l + r,) 
[3 .3] 
lfthe proceeds from the loan are saved , then the addi ti on of the debt makes no 
difference in the total resources avail ab le for consumption, V,. Continuing with Hanna 
and colleagues' (1995) simplifyi ng assu mption that the rate of return on investments 
equal s th e interest rate on debt, the present value of the payments on the debt , 
assuming they last for n years, equals the value o f the debt as follows: 
lt-1 [3.4] 
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Equation 1.4 represents I as an o ffsetting cash flow against future non-
in vestment income and therefore, future non-investment income can be shown as net 
future non-investment income and the offsetting I will be removed from the prior 
period assets as shown in equation 1.5: 
[
N y 
v, =(A, _,+ I,_,)+ Y, + L ( , )"_, 
t+t I + r, 
N p ] L , ,_, 




Again, the total resources availabl e for consumption are unchanged. If the 
assumption of equal interest rates on debt and assets is relaxed, and the household has 
a hi gher average rate of return across all assets th an the cost of debt, then the 
household will be able to increase the total resources available for consumption by 
borrowing and investing the proceeds. The increase in the total resources available for 
consumption can be calculated as the difference between the proceeds of the loan less 
the present value of the payment based on the interest rate of the loan, d, and 
discounted at the rate of return on the assets, s. The value of the debt, when invested, 
is equal to the proceeds of the loan because they wi ll be generating a rate of return 
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equal to the discount rate used to estimate their present value. The payments on the 
loan, K, are shown in equation 1.7. 
K, 
ld,(l+d,)" 
(l +d,)"- 1 
Substituting K for Pin equation 1.5 with the assumption that d < s, and 
isolati ng thei r effects, the change in V, is shown in equation 1.8. 
[3.7] 
[3.8] 
The individual wi ll continue to borrow to in vest until the marginal costs of 
borrowing equal the marginal benefits gained from borrowing. As an individual 
becomes more indebted, the cost of debt rises because of the ri sks of bankruptcy. The 
individual may also invest more conservatively, dri ving down the rate of return on 
assets, in order to increase their cert ainty that fi xed debt payments can be made 
without causing financi al distress. Th is specu lation is supported by Fratantoni 's 
(2001) fi nding that heavily indebted individuals, such as home owners with a 
mortgage, exhib it lower risk tolerance with their investments. 
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Two important assumptions were made regarding the conclusion, first the 
individual ' s risk to lerance is such that they currently earn an average rate of return on 
the ir assets in excess of the debt's cost. Second, that the indi vidual's inter\emporal 
utility function is opt imized by such borrowing and sav ing behavior. These two 
ass umptions are represented by Q, in equation 1.1. 
The effect of taxes is similar to the effect of differences in the interest rates on 
savings and debt. For illustra ti on of thi s effect , the assumption that the interest rate on 
debts is equal to the rate of return on assets is appli ed. Based on this assumption, 
equation 1.5 is relevant. 
[
N y N p l v - A +1 +Y + I - I I- ( 1- 1 1-1 ) I I( )n-1 I( )n-1 
1+ 1 l +r1 1+1 l+r1 
(3.5) 
If taxes are introduced into the model, and assuming they are constant across 
periods, then equation 1.5 can be rewritten as : 
V = ( A + 1 )*(1 -g )+Y*(1-g) +[fY, *(1 -g,)_ fP,*(l- g,)] [3.9) I 1- l 1- J 0 I I L.... ( ) 11 - 1 L....J ( )Il-l 
1+1 1 +r1 t+l 1 +r, 
where g. is the margi nal tax rate on income from assets faced by the indi vid ual and g, 
is the marginal tax rate on non-investment income. Two different tax rates are 
included in the model in order to demonstrate that interest can be deducted at the 
marginal non-investment income tax rate, while investment income generated from 
assets, in particular dividends and capital gains, is taxed at lower marginal rates. 
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Since the principal from the debt is the only argument in equation 1.9 that is 
affected by the different tax rates on non-investment and investment in_come, on ly 
those arguments will determine the change in resources, LIV,. Arguments in equation 
1.9 not containing I or P wi ll be treated as constants. Equation 1.10 shows the change 
in total resources, Ll V,, resulting from the unequa l marginal tax rates at which the cost 
of debt is deducted and the earnings on the invested debt are taxed. The last argument 
in equat ion 1.9 equals the sum of future debt payments discounted by the interest rate 
on debt. Since, in thi s example, the interest rate on debt is equal to the interest rate on 
savings, and treating (1 - g,) as a constant, the sum of future payments can be written 
as (1 - g,) * 1,_1, as shown in equation 1.1 0, where g, < g,. 
av, =(I,_, • (1- g,))- ((I- g, )'!,_,) = !,_, '(g, - g,) (3. 10) 
Equation 1.10 shows that when the interest rates on assets and debt are the 
same, some combination of debt and individual savings will maximize current 
reso urces. This conc lusion is similar to the conclus ion of the tradeoff theory and 
represents the upper bound of potential economic benefits that could be gained from 
leverage. The last equation in 1.10 is rewritten below to incorporate the leverage ratio 
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into the equation, which is equal to the ratio of debt to total assets multiplied by total 
assets . 
l1V, ! ,_1 *(A + 1 )"( ) 
( ) 
I I / - I . gi - ga A,_1 + 1,_1 -
[3.1 1] 
Thus, equations 1.8 and 1.11 are mathematical depictions of how household 
leverage can posit ively affect changes in total resources available. The purpose of this 
study was not to detem1ine whether equation 1.8 or 1.11 dominates, but rather to 
determine whether there is any empirica l suppo11 of a posi ti ve relation between debt 
and wealth. 
As mentioned previously, a comparison of historical rates of return expected 
from the various savings options was appropri ate, assuming that the individual 
remains committed to his or her dec ided course of action . However, as research has 
shown (Dalbar, 2001), the average investor experiences a rate of return significantly 
below the market rate of return and therefore the indi vidual 's actual ex perience should 
be used. 
Model Specification and Design 
Based on the review of literature and theoretical frameworks for the study, a 
conceptual d iagram can be drawn dep icting the relati on between household leverage 
and changes in total resources, while controlling for various factors . This was a 
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correlational study employing a balanced panel longitudinal design using the I 992, 
I 9\14, I 996, I \198, 2000, and 2002 waves oft he Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
TJu·ee factors were used to proxy the change in total resources, LIV, in equation I .1: 
househo ld leverage, income and work status, and initial wealth. The household 's 
preferences, which must also be accounted for in order to measure the _affects of 
leverage on changes in wealth, were represented by .Q in equation I . I. Three 
addi tional factors were included in the conceptual model representing Q, these factors 
were health , bequests and inheritance, and demographics. The following diagram 




Income and work 




--:::..---:__r ,  
~ ' Demographics 1 
~
-------------
Change in total ~---------------Initial wealth 
------------~ ,/' resources 
Figure 3.1. lllustration of the conceptual model. 
Based on the conceptual model developed in the proceeding section, an 
individual 's utility can be expressed as a function of their consumption, subject to 
their preferences. 
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U = u(C; Q) [3 .12) 
Consumption in tum is a function of the individual's resources, also subject to 
their preferences. 
C = c(V; Q) [3.13) 
Furthermore, a household 's total resources can be estimated in the following 
manner: 
V = v(L, I, W ; Q) [3.14) 
where L, I, W, and .Orepresent vectors of variables . Lis the degree of household 
leverage, I is the cunent income and work status, and Wis the household 's initial 
wealth. Based on the conceptual model diagramed in Figure 3.1, .Qis represented by 
vectors of variab les for health status, bequests and inheritance, and demographic 
characteristi cs. The change in total resources is likewise a function of these same 
variables and is denoted as: 
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D.V = v(L, I, W; H, B, D) [3. 15] 
where H represents the household 's health status, B bequest motives and inheritance, 
and D the household 's demographic characteri stics. 
Data A.nalysis 
Comparative Statistics 
Ch i-square and r-test statisti cs were used to address the first objective of this 
study, namely to compare and contrast the charac teristics (i. e., total resources, income 
and savings, portfolio allocation, hea lth , and demographics) of leveraged households 
(households with mortgage debt) with unleveraged households (households without 
mortgage debt) in 1992 and 2002. 
Trends in assets and tota l resources were charted based on the year of 
observation. Trends in the leverage ratio and mortgage debt were charted by the year 
of observation and by the age of the household, respectively. 
Empirical Model 
Robust multivariate regression was used to address the second objective, 
namely to examine the rela ti on between household leverage and the change in the 
household's total resources during the period from 1992 to 2002 while controlling for 
other factors such as non-investment income, in itial wealth, portfolio allocation, 
health status, and demographics . To account for possible sample selection bias 
introduced by non-random attrition of the sample fro m 1992 to 2002, Heckman 's 
( 1979) two-stage procedure was also used. 
56 
The full balanced panel design eliminates all households that were not 
surveyed in each of the six survey waves. Zi li ak and Kniesner ( 1998) have argued 
that sample attriti on over time may not be random. If the attrition is non-random, then 
the estimated regression parameters are biased. The bias resu lts in non-zero 
covariance in the error term of the estimated regression model, which in tum biases 
the esti mated parameters. This is a result of the model predicting not only the effects 
of the individual variables on the change in total resources, but also attempting. to 
pred ict that the household did not drop out of the sample. 
Zi li ak and Kniesner (1998) recommended using Heckman's (1979) procedure 
to control for non-random sample attrition resulting in sample selection bias. First the 
probabi lity of dropping out was estimated for the sub sample of home owners in 1992, 
using probit or logit procedures . Second, the in verse Mill 's ratio, or A (lambda), was 
estimated. Third, A was included in the est imated model as an exogenous variab le. 
By including A in the regress ion model, sample se lection bias was controlled for and 
the resulting regress ion parameters were consistent. 
Fo llowing the procedure outlined by Heckman (1979), equation 1.16 




P, = E(Y= ![X, )= l+ e-(a+P,x.) [3.16) 
where Y =I if the i1" household was surveyed in 2002, X, is a vector of exogenous 
variables, a is a constant, and/), is a vector of parameters associated with the 
exogenous variables. Equation 1.16 is nonlinear with respect to fJ, and X,. As 






Where the ratio of ? 1 over I - P1 is simply the odds ratio of the i1" household being 
surveyed in both 1992 and 2002. The model can be made linear with respect to/}, by 
taking the natura l log of both sides, as shown in Equation 1.18. 
L = ln(_!l_) =a+ ax. 
I 1-P, /Jj I [3 .18] 
The natural log of the odds ratio, or L, also called the logit, in Equation 1.18 
represents the logit model (Gujarati , 2002). The logit model is linear with respect to 
/)1 and can be estimated by using maximum likelihood procedures. Once the Jogit was 
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estimated for each household surveyed in I 992, the probability of that househo ld also 
being surveyed in 2002 could be estimated using Equation I .16. 
The estimated probability found in Equation I. I 6 was then used in the inverse 
of the standard nonnal cumulative distribution function to obtain the equivalent output 
of a probit procedure (Lee, I 983; Smits, 2003). The resul ts oft he transfonnation, Z,, 
were then included in the est imation of A, for each househo ld. A, was estimated in the 
following manner, as illustrated by Heckman (I 979): 
(3.19) 
where rp is the probability density function of a standard nom1al variab le and 1/J is the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard nonnal variab le. The resulting A1 could 
then be included as a regressor in the ordinary least squares regression model to 
con trol for possible bias arising from non-random sampling. 
Heckman's (I 979) two-stage estimation procedure has been suggested to 
correct for sample selecti on bias (Kim, 2002; Z ili ak & K.niesner, I 998). Kim used 
age, marital status, race, education, income, home ownership, mobility status, and 
region as detem1inants of sample attrition. Similar determinants were used in this 
study to obtain the inverse Mills ratio, or lambda, from the Heckman procedure. 
Robust multivariate regression was an appropriate method of analysis for the 
data and object ives because of the heavy-tailed and continuous distribution of the 
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dependent variab les. This approach was similar to Kennickell and Starr-McCluer 
( 19'J7) analysis of changes in wealth using the Survey of Consumer Finances 1983 to 
1989 panel data. 
Robust multivariate regress ion uses an iterative process to weight the 
individual cases. ln OLS regression, each case receives a weight equal to 1. Outlier 
cases can exert substantial influence on estimated model coefficients and errors. This 
problem is particularly acute for heavy-tailed data where a significant number of cases 
could be deemed "outliers." Robust regression analysis provides a method whereby 
outli er cases are identified and systematicall y down weighted so they can be included 
in the analysis without resulting in severe estimation errors (Hamilton, 1992). 
Hamilton (1992) suggests a robust weighting procedure where cases are first 
weighted using Huber estimation followed by Tukey's biweight estimation procedure. 
Huber estimation begins with the estimation of an OLS model for the data. Residuals 
are scaled using some scale estimate. A tuning constant is specified and cases with 
residuals greater than the tuning constant are assigned weights less than one. A 
second weighted least squares model is estimated incorporating the weights derived 
from the results of the preceding estimated model. Again, cases with residuals greater 
than some constant are assigned a weight less than one and the process is again 
repeated . The process is repeated until the maximum change in case weights is less 
than 0.05. 
Once the maximum change in weights falls below 0.05, Tukey's biweight 
procedure is applied to the model. The procedure is similar to Huber estimation; 
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however, a different weight function is used. Tukey's biweight procedure (Mosteller 
& Tukey, 1977, as ci ted in Hamilton, 1992) assigns weights to all cases in the sample. 
Any ex treme residuals remaining after the init ial iterative weighting procedure using 
Huber est imation are assigned a weight equal to zero. A weighted least squares model 
is estimated using Tukey' s biweights and the biweight function is applied to the 
resu lting case residuals. The process is repeated until maximum changes in the 
estimated weights are less than 0.01. Because the we ights used in the estimated model 
are a random variab le, the standard errors must be adj usted to reflect the bias 
introduced in the weighting procedure. The following section provides greater detail 
on the procedure used in thi s study. 
A common sca le factor for the res iduals of the estimated OLS model is the 
standard deviat ion of the res iduals; however, the residual 's standard deviation can be 
significant ly influenced by outliers. An altemative scale to the standard deviation of 
the error (e,) was used in thi s study. The altemat ive scale was the median absolute 
deviation of the error, or MAD: 
MAD = median le1 - median(e)l [3.20] 
MAD was standardized by dividing it by the constant 0.6745. The constant is the 
midpoint of the absolute value of a standard normal variable (Fox, 2002). Dividing 
MAD by the midpoint of the standard normal variable gives a scale estimate that was 
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resistant to the effects of outliers, because it is based on the median, rather the mean of 




residuals were then scaled in the following manner: 
[3.22] 
s 
Using Huber estimat ion, the following we ight function was applied to the 
scaled residuals from the estimated OLS model: 
if lu,l 5 c [3.23a] 
c 
if lu'l > c [3.23b] 
The tuning constant, c, for this study was I .345 which resulted in an estimation 
procedure 95% as efficient as OLS estimation (Hamilton, 1992). The esti mated 
weights were then used in a weighted least squares procedure using SPSS 12.0 for 
Windows. The same weight function and tuning constant were reappli ed to the data 
and new weights were estimated. Six iterations of the procedure were perfom1ed 
before the maximum change in the weights was 0.02. 
For the two estimated models in this study for change in assets and change in 
total resources, the 7'h and 6'h iterations of the procedure applied Tukey's biweight 
estimate function to the residuals from the 6'h and 5'h iterations, respectively. The 
biweight function app li ed to the residuals was: 
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if Ju,J ~ c [3 .24a] 
if Ju,J>c [3.24b] 
A new tuning constant equal to 4.685 was used with the biweight function. The 
tuning constant used resulted in 95% efficiency relative toOLS models (Hamilton, 
1992). The procedure was repeated using weighted least square regression . After the 
15'h and II <h iterations for the two models the maximum change in the estimated 
weights was 0.0045 and 0.0086, respect ively. The estimated coefficients' standard 
errors were corrected using a procedure outlined by Street, Carroll, and Rupert (as 
cited in Hamilton). 
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Continuing from the conceptual model, the following empirical model was 
used to detem1ine the effects of leverage on changes in asset and total resources while 
controll ing for other characteristics: 
I I I 
G2 t::.TR, = G2 {,80, + ,81,L, + ,82,1, + ,B, w; + ,LJ.,B, + ,85,H, + ,86,D, + fJ7,A., } + G2 c, 
[3.25a] 
I I I 
G2t::.As1; = G' {,B0, +,81,L, +,821 1, +,B,, w; +,B,,B, +,B,, H, +,86,D, +,B,,..i,)+G2c, 
[3.25b] 
where L, 1, W. B, H, and D were vectors of independent variables and ,81, ,81, ,81, ,8,, ,85, 
and ,86 were vectors of parameters assoc iated with the independent vari ables. G111 was 
a vector of weight variables deri ved from robust regression procedure, L was a vector 
of the vari ables related to the household 's leverage ratio, 1 was a vector of variab les 
related to the household's income and sav ings behavior, Wwas a vector of variables 
related to initial wealth. These three vectors were the principal components of total 
resources and proxy V, in Equation 1.1. B, H, and D represented vectors of variables 
related to bequests, health stat us, and demographics, respectively, and proxy D. in 
Eq uation 1.14. The model also included -l, which controlled for sample selection 
bias. The error term, c,, is nom1al ly dis tributed with a mean of zero . 
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Two models were estimated. The first model estimated the change in 
household assets from 1992 to 2002 . The dependent variable for the second model 
was the change in the household's to tal resources from 1992 to 2002. Because the 
data was longitudinal, the stationarity of the dependent vari ables was examined to 
detem1ine whether a more appropriate estimation method would be an autoregressive 
in tegrated moving average (ARIMA) model. The data was tested for non stationarity 
and no evidence of that problem was fou nd. The models were also tested for 
autocorrelation, heteroskedac ity, and multi colinearity. Autocorrelation was tested 
using the Durbin-Watson stati stic and the presence ofmulti colinearity was checked 
using the condition index and variance inflati on factors. Heteroskedac ity in the 
estimated changes in wealth was checked by ex ami ning the estimated squared 
residuals against changes in assets (Gujarati , 2002). 
Data and Measurement 
Data 
The Health and Retirement Study is an ongoing national longitudinal survey 
conducted every two years by the Survey Research Center at the Univers ity of 
Michigan. This study used data gathered in the 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002 waves of the Health and Reti rement Study {Institute for Social Research , 1995, 
1998, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). The study is fu nded largely by the ational 
Insti tut e on Aging (Juster & Suzman, 1995). The original HRS sample consisted of 
ind iv id uals and thei r partners, if applicabl e, who were between the ages of 51 and 6 1 
at the time of the first wave in 1992. The intent of the HRS is to provide researchers 
from a variety of different fields with insight into the transition from the labor force 
into retirement. 
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The sample size for the initial wave of the HRS consisted of 12,654 
individuals. Approximately 81% of the initial sample was married, and women 
represented 53.6% of the origina l sample. Where possible, both spouses were . 
interviewed and included in the sample, even if on ly the selected spouse met the age 
crit eria. The sample design over-sampled African Americans and Hispanics in order 
to allow researchers the ability to in vestigate these groups individually. The sample 
design also over-sampled individuals in Florida. As a result of over-sampling of some 
gro ups and geographic areas, and the inclusion of age ineli gib le spouses in the sample, 
the data set includes individual and househo ld weights, which when applied to the 
individual or household cases make the data a nati onally representative sample. 
The HRS is an idea l sample to address the objecti ves of this study because of 
it s represent ati ve nature and age of respondents. The respondents in the HRS are 
likely in their peak savings and investing years as they prepare for retirement or enter 
retirement. The idea of util izing household leverage to increase wealth wo uld be most 
app li cab le to thi s population because of their stage in the life cycle. 
Thi s study limited the sample to stable households- households that did not 
experience a change in mari tal status during the period of observation, were 
interviewed in each wave of the study, and reported owning their home in 1992. 
Household leverage, income and savings, health status and some demographic 
variables were calculated over the 1992 to 2002 time period. All dollar calculations 
were adjusted to reflect constant 2002 dollars. 
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The HRS includes imputed values for missing financial information. Missing 
values for some other variables associated with pensions are also imputed. ln order to 
preserve the sample size for this study, impu ted values for missing infonnation were 
used in this study. 
Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study were the first differences between: total 
resources in 2002 and total resources in 1992, and household assets in 2002 and 
household assets in 1992. This approach was simi lar to Kennickell and Starr-
McCluer's (1997) approach when they examined changes in wealth using panel data 
from the 1983 to 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances. The first model estimated the 
change in assets between 1992 and 2002, while the second model estimated the 
change in total resources during the period. 
Total resources and household assets were estimated for each observation 
period in the following manner. First, all variables denoted by dollars were adjusted 
to 2002 dollars . This adjustment was based on the historical inflation information in 
Ibbotson Associates (2002). Second, all reported net worth was summed for each 
household. Reported net worth included: bank accounts, CDs, stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds, lRAs, Keoghs, cash value life insurance, annuities, defined contribution 
retirement plans, coll ectibles, vehic le equity, home equity, other rea l estate, and 
bus iness ho ldi ngs. Assets reported in the HRS were reported at their net value, or 
what the household would have had if they had so ld the asset and paid off all debts 
assoc iated wi th the asset. This const itutes househo ld assets for each period of 
observat ion. Add itional steps were necessary to calculate the total resources for the 
household . 
67 
The next step in calculating the househo ld 's total resources required the 
estimation of the present value of future cash flows such as defined benefi t pensions, 
VA pension, and Social Security benefi ts. 111 order to estimate the present va lue of 
these assets, an appropriate discount rate was detem1ined. Because of the guaranteed 
nat ure of Social Security, and the cost of li ving adjustments included with it, the 
fu ture payments were discounted usi ng the average real yield on long-te1m U.S. 
Treasury Bonds for the period of January I, 1992 to December I, 2002. The real rate 
of retum was calcu lated using data reported by Ibbotson Associates (2002). Defined 
benefit pension plans that include a cost of li ving adjustment were a lso discounted 
using the average real yield discussed above. The average real yield on the I 0-year 
U.S . Treasury Bond was used because of the long-tem1 nature of these payments. The 
majority of households will receive these cash flow s for at least 10 years, but not more 
than 20 years based on life expectancies. The I 0-year U.S . Treasury Bond most 
close ly approximated this time hori zon. The average nominal yie ld was used to 
discount defi ned benefit pensions that did not have cost-of-living adjustment features. 
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The age of the sample provided an advantage in determining the present value 
of Social Security and defined benefit pensions because many individuals in the 
sample began drawing on these assets during the observation period and the actual 
benefits were observed rather than estimated. The antic ipated duration of such cash 
flows as reported by the responden t was used in the present value calculati on. For 
life-long cash flows, the life tables published by the U.S. Center for Disease Control 
were used to detem1ine the life expectancy of White and Black males and females 
(United States Center for Disease Contro l, 2003). The life tables did not include 
estimates for Hispanic males and females; therefore, Hispanics were assigned life 
expectancies based on the life tab les for White males and females. 
The present value of Social Security benefits in each wave was estimated by 
taking the present value of the payments received by the household. For years when 
benefits had not yet begun, the amount ofrepor1ed benefits in later years was 
di scounted back to that year. For households that had not begun to receive Social 
Security benefits by 2002, their expected Social Security benefits were used. The 
expected Social Security benefit was based on the individual's response to the 
following questions , "Do you expect to receive Social Security benefi ts at some time 
in the future?" (Institute for Social Research , 2003b, variab le #HJ4 79), "At what age 
do you expect to start collecting these benefits?" (Institute for Social Research, 2003b, 
variable #HJ480), and "If you start collecting Social Security benefits then, about how 
much do you expect the payments to be in today's dollars?"(lnstitute for Social 
Research, 2003b, variable #HJ481 ). The 1992 present value of Social Security 
payments was calculated as the di scounted present value of Social Securi ty benefits 
found in subsequent waves. 
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A simi lar approach to that out lined above was used to detem1ine the present 
va lue of any defined benefit pensions to which the household was entitled. First, the 
present value of current defined benefit pension payments was calculated for those 
households that began to receive benefits during the period of observation. The 
present va lue of such payments was estimated based on whether the payments were 
adjusted fo r cost-of-livi ng increases and whether the tenn of payments were designed 
to be single-life, joint-life, or for a spec ific te1m. If the respondent indicated that the 
payments were periodically adjusted for cost-of-living increases, the real rate ofretum 
on the 1 0-year U.S. Treasury note was used to ca lcul ate the present value . If the 
payments were not adj usted for increases in the cost of li ving, the nomi nal rate of 
return on the 1 0-year U.S. Treasury note was used in the calculations. Defined benefit 
pension payments observed in the later years of the period of observation were 
discoun ted back to previous years. 
The present value of future benefits was estimated for those individuals in the 
2002 wave that reported being covered by a defined benefit plan, but who had not yet 
begun to receive payments. For these indiv iduals, the expected payments and terms of 
payment were calculated using infonnation provided by the respondent. In 2002, at 
least one individual in 427 households reported being covered by an employer 
sponsored defined benefit pension program sponsored by their employer. Of these 
cases, 2 I 8 Jacked sufficient data to esti mate the amount of the expected benefit 
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payments or the present va lue o f such payments. If the individual responded that they 
"Don't know" or "Refused" to state the amount of future benefits , then the interviewer 
asked a series of questions to obtain some range within which the expected amount 
laid. Using the midpoint of these ranges, 6 additional presen t value calculat ions were 
made reducing the number of missing cases to 212. These cases were dropped from 
the sample because the present value of expec ted defined benefit pensions could not 
be estimated. 
Ando and Modigliani (1963) discounted all future eamings by the real rate of 
retu m eamed on assets by the household. The data did not provide sufficient detail to 
calculate an accurate rate of return on all assets. Gutter (2000), when estimating the 
va lue of an indi vidual's human capital, discoun ted future eami ngs using the long-run 
rate of return on large cap stocks reported by Jbbotson Associates. A similar approach 
was used in this study. All future eamings were discounted using the nominal rate on 
large cap stocks, as reported by Jbbotson Associates (2002), for the period 1992 
through 2002. This time period was unusual because it captured one of the longest 
periods of economic expansion in U.S. history resulting in a discount rate higher than 
the long-run average. However, the higher discount rate on future earnings used in 
thi s stu dy was waJTanted because of the rapid pace at which the economy was 
changing during thi s time period as a resu lt of new technology, innovation, and 
general modernization. This change in the economy resulted in substantial job 
turnover and job eli mination. Older workers may have been a vu lnerab le segment of 
the labor fo rce during this time period, th us increasing the uncertainty of future 
earnings. The greater uncertainty regarding future earnings was captured with the 
higher discount rate. 
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Actual constant dollar earnings from 1992 to 2002 were used to estimate the 
present value of the individual 's, and household's, future earnings. The present va lue 
of future eamings was calculated for individua ls still working in 2002 based on the 
individua l's 2002 earnings from employment and the earlier of the respondent's 
expected age at retirement, age when they expect to reduce their work hours, or life 
expectancy. 
independent Variables 
Morrgage debt. The household's initial amount of mortgage debt in 1992 was 
equa l to the total amount of any debt secured against the household's primary and 
secondary residence, including outstanding home equi ty lines of credit and any 
mortgages on second homes. This amount was adjusted to reOect 2002 dollars. 
Leverage ratio. The household 's initial leverage ratio was calculated by 
dividing the household 's mortgage debt by total assets. All model estimations 
included the leverage ratio calculated using total assets. A second leverage ratio was 
also calcu lated using the household's total resources in the denominator for illustrative 
purposes. For all ca lculations the value of the household's residencies was included at 
full va lue rather than net value. 
Changes in housing debt were also observed from 1992 to 2002. A 
dichotomous variable (1, 0) was used to indicate whether a household paid off, 
maintained or incurred, or remained without mortgage debt from 1992 to 2002. 
Households without mortgage debt in 1992 and 2002 were used as the reference 
group. 
Based on the tradeoff theory and findings among bankruptcy filers, too much 
leverage cou ld resu lt in very negative consequences for households and could act to 
diminish rather than increase total resources available. In order to proxy this effect, 
the square of the initial leverage ratio multiplied by I ,000 was included in the model. 
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Total household income. Total household income included income from all 
sources before taxes. Total household income was used to proxy the household's 
margina l tax bracket. Because of the variety of tax rates on various types of income, 
as well as the variety of deductions, credits, and exemptions offered in the IRS tax 
code, no attempt to estimate the household's marginal tax rate was made. In addition 
to the complexities of the tax code, sign ificant changes were made to the tax code in 
1992 which introduced new tax rates and brackets (Tax Policy Center, n.d.). 
Work trend. The household's trend in work status from I 992 to 2002 was also 
included in the models. The household was deemed to be working if the respondent 
was employed, temporarily laid off, or looking for work. Individuals that reported 
being disabled or retired were categorized as not working. For married households, if 
either spouse was working, the household was categorized as working. Individuals 
that reported being a homemaker were assigned the work status of their partner, if 
partnered; if not partnered, homemakers were categorized as not working. Individuals 
that refused to provide their working status, or reported an other status, were assigned 
their partner's status if married. If not married, or neither partner reported their status, 
the status was assigned the status in 1992 or 2002, whichever wave had reported 
inforn1ation. If neither wave contained the individual's or partner's status, the case 
was dropped from the sample. Fifteen cases were dropped. 
In ilia/ lola/ resources. Ini tial total resources were calculated for all 
households in 1992. Households were then ranked and separated into percentile 
categories similar to those used by Kennickel and Starr-McCJuer (I 997). A 
di chotomous variable was then used to classifY each household into its respective 
percentile category. The group with the least amount of total resources was used as 
the reference group. 
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Risky asse/ allocQ/ion. The household 's al location of non-housing assets to 
risky investments was calculated. Previous studies, such as Friend and Blume ( 1975), 
defined risky assets as those having uncertainty associated with their returns. 
Included in this definit ion would be bonds, home equity, and human capital. This 
study examined the effect of household leverage, through the use of mortgages, on 
changes in wealth. One way for leveraging to be effecti ve was to invest the borrowed 
funds in assets yielding rates of return greater than the rate of interest being charged 
on the borrowed funds . For this study, risky assets were those assets that have 
historically earned higher rates of return than the interest rate on mortgage debt. Since 
the interest rate on mot1gage debt is based on interest rates in the bond market plus a 
spread, bonds were not considered risky assets for this study. Higher-yielding bonds 
were available to investors, however, the HRS does not differentiate between high-
yield and other bonds. Furthem10re, the interest income from bonds (other than 
municipal bonds) does not receive favorable tax treatment and is taxed at the 
household's marginal tax rate, thus offsetting the favorable tax treatment of the 
mortgage debt. 
Ownership, or equity assets, have hi storically eamed rates of retum higher 
than that charged for mortgage debt. This asset category included stocks, business 
holdings, investment real estate, and equity mutual funds. For IRAs and defined 
contribution retirement accounts in which the individual could direct the investment 
choices, respondents were asked how the money was invested and then given the 
following choices: (I) mostly or all stocks; (2) mostly or all interest earning; (3) 
evenly split; (4) other; (8) don't know; or (9) refused (111stitute for Social Research, 
2003a, variab le #F4907, #F4928, #F3472) . The HRS did not contain asset allocation 
information for every IRA or defined contribution retirement plan the respondent 
mentioned. The reported asset allocation of existing IRAs or defined contribution 
plans was applied to those accounts for which asset allocation information was not 
available. 
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To detem1ine the amount of ri sky assets in these accounts, two-thirds of the 
account was counted as risky if the respondent said it was "mostly or all stocks," half 
of the account value was deemed risky if the respondent selected "evenly split," and 
one-third of the account value was considered to be allocated to risky assets if the 
respondent selected "mostly or all interest eaming." For respondents who did not 
kllow the asset allocation within the account, refused to answer the question, or who 
had allocated the assets within the account differently than the choices available, the 
account was treated as if it were split evenly between ri sky and non-risky assets. 
Asset allocation was measured in the 1998 wave of the study. Waves prior to 1998 
did not contain sufficient information to record asset allocation. 
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inheritances. A dichotomous variable (I, 0) was used to measure whether the 
household received an inheritance from 1992 to 2002, based on the household 's 
response to the following question in each wave of the study, " ln the last two years did 
you (or your husband/or your wife/ or your partner/ ... ) receive a lump sum of money 
or property that you have not already told me abo ut/ Do not include loans or gifts?" 
(Institute for Social Research, 2003c, variable #E4748). Inheritances were 
specifically identified as one of the answer choices. 
The household's intentions to leave an inheritance was measured by its 
response to the following question in the first wave of the study, "Do you [and you 
(husband/wife/partner)] expect to leave a sizable inheritance to your heirs?" (Institute 
for Socia l Research, 1995, variable #V5349) . The responses to the question were 
categorical and inc luded the following: (I) yes, definitely; (2) yes, probably; (3) yes, 
possibly; (4) probably not; (5) no, definitely; (8) don't know; and (9) NA. Responses 
I through 3 were assigned to their own categories, responses 4 through 9 were 
combined and represent the reference category. 
Other debt. The amount of other debt was a con tinuous variable, measured in 
thousands of dollars, and was equal to the all other household debts such as credit 
cards, medical , and other consumption debts. Auto loans and investment debts were 
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indirectly reported with their corresponding assets since all assets were reported net of 
any debt owed for them. 
Health status. Health status was measured by the individual's response to the 
following question, "Next I have some questions abo ut your health. Would you say 
your health is exce llent, very good, good, fair, or poor?" (lnstitute for Social Research, 
1995, variab le #V301 ). If the household was married, the average of the respondent's 
reported health status was used as a proxy for the household's initial health status in 
1992. A dichotomous variab le (I , 0) was used to categorize households' self-rated 
health in 1992 as excellent, very good, good, or fair/poor health. Fair/poor health was 
the reference category for initial health status. 
The change in self-rated health status for the household from 1992 to 2002 was 
measured with a dichotomous variable (I, 0) indicating whether the household's 
health status improved, declined, or remained the same. Those households that 
experienced declining health were used as the reference group. 
Household size. The size of the household equaled the total of all individuals 
residing at the home. In 1992, if a chi ld was attending school , who otherwise would 
have li ved with the household, they were included in the household size calculation. 
Household size was measured in 1992 and 2002. 
Age. The age of the individual was measured by the calculated age of the 
respondent based on his or her year of birth, or variable number 46 in 1992. If the 
household was married, the age of the oldest spouse in 1992 was used. 
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Educalion. The education of the household was measured by the response to 
the question, "What is the highest grade of school or year of college you completed?" 
(lnstitute for Social Research, 1995, variable #207). The highest year of schooling 
completed by the individual for single househo lds, or the average of the highest year 
o f schooling completed by partnered households, as reported in 1992, .was used. The 
highest year of college completed was top coded at 17 years of educat ion . 
MariiG! slalltS. lnitial marital statuses were measured using responses to the 
following questions, "Please remind me, are you cun·ently married, living with a 
partner, separated, divorced, widowed, or have you never been married?" (Institute for 
Social Research , 1995, variab le #225), and an interviewer designated variable ':Sex of 
respondent" (Institute for Social Research, 1995, variable #47). Based on the 
individual's responses a dichotomous variab le("!, 0) was created and used to classify 
the individual as married, single female , or single male. Married households served as 
the reference group . 
Race or e1hnici1y. The race of the household was measured by the family 
respondent's response to the following questions: "Do you consider yourself to be 
Hispanic or Lat ino?" (Institute fo r Social Research, 1995, variable #2 16), and "Do you 
consider yourse lf primarily White or Caucasian, Black or African American, 
American Indian, or Asian?" (lnstitute for Social Research, 1995, variable #22 1 ). 
Using a dummy variable (1, 0), the responses were categorized into Black or African 
American, Hispanic, non-Hispanic White, and other. 
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The following table summarizes the variables used in the models and how the 
variables were measured. All doll ar ligures are in constant 2002 dollars. 
Table 3.1 
Measurement of Variables 
Variable 
Change in assets 
Change in total resources 
Household leverage 
Leverage rat io 
Change in mortgage debt 
Paid off 
Kept or incuned 
No debt (reference) 
Leverage ratio squared 




Assets in 2002 minus assets in 1992 (in OOOs) 
Tota l resources in 2002 minus total resources 
in 1992 (in OOOs) 
The sum o f all outstand ing debt secured by the 
primary or secondary residence divided by the 
household's assets or total resources (x 1 000) 
1 if mortgage debt in 1992 was greater than 
zero and equal to zero in 2002, 0 otherwise 
1 if mortgage debt in 2002 was greater than 
zero, 0 otherwise 
1 if mortgage debt was zero in 1992 and 2002, 
0 otherwise 
Square of 1992 leverage ratio 
Total household income reported in 1991 
Variable 
Working to not working 
Not working to working 
Not working to not working 
Working to working 
(reference) 
Initial wealth and portfolio 
lnitial percentile of total 
resources 
25'h to so•h 
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Measurement 
I if at least one respondent in the household 
was working in 1992 and no respondents were 
working in 2002, 0 otherwise 
I if no respondents in the household were 
working in 1992 and at least on respondent 
was working in 2002, 0 othenvise 
I if no respondents in the household were 
working in 1992 or 2002, 0 otherwise 
I if at least one respondent was working in 
1992 and 2002, 0 otherwise 
I if the household's total resources in 1992 
were greater than or equal to the 25 'h 
percentile for the total sample and less than 
the 50'h percentil e for the total sample, 0 
otherwise 
Variable 
50'' to 75" 
75'' to 90'' 
90'" to I 00'" 
0 to 25'" (reference) 
Risky asset allocation 
Amount of other debt 
Inheritance 
Measurement 
1 if the household's total resources in 1992 
were greater than or equal to the 50'" 
percentile for the total sample and less than 
the 75 '" percenti le for the total sample, 0 
otherwise 
1 if the household ' s total resources in 1992 
were greater than or equal to the 75'" 
percen tile for the total sample and less than 
the 90'" percentile for the total sample, 0 
otherwise 
1 if the household ' s total resources in 1992 
were greater than or equal to the 90'" 
percentile for the total sample, 0 otherwise 
I if the household's total resources in I 992 
were less than the 25 '" percentile for the total 
sample, 0 otherwise 
Total ri sky assets I (Total assets minus net 
housing assets) 
Cred it card, medical , and other consumption 





I if the household received an inheritance 
between 1992 and 2002, 0 otherwise 
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Lik elihood of leaving a sizable Expected likelihood of leaving an estate 
estate measured on a continuous scale from 0 to I 00 
Definitely I if the household definitely expects to leave a 
sizable estate, 0 otherwise 
Probably I if the household probably expects to leave a 
sizable estate, 0 otherwise 
Possibly I if the household possibly expects to leave a 
Not likely (reference) 
Health 




Fair or poor (reference) 
Change in health status 
sizable estate, 0 otherwise 
1 if the household does not expect to leave a 
sizeable estate, 0 otherwise 
I if the average self-rated health status is 
excellent in 1992, 0 otherwise 
I if the average self-rated health status is very 
good in I 992, 0 otherwise 
I if the average self-rated health status is good 
in 1992, 0 otherwise 
I if the average self-rated health status is fair 













Marita l status 
Single fema le 
Measurement 
1 if self-rated health was unchanged in 2002 
compared to 1992, 0 otherwise 
I if self- rated health in 2002 was higher than 
self-rated health in 1992, 0 otherwise 
1 if self-rated health in 2002 was less than 
self-rated health in 1992, 0 otherwise 
Total number of individual residing in the 
household 
1 if household size in 1992 was less than the 
household size in 2002, 0 otherwise 
I if household size in 1992 was greater than 
household size in 2002, 0 otherwise 
! ifhousehold size in 1992 was equal to 
household size in 2002, 0 otherwise 
Age of individual, or oldest spouse, in 1992 
Highest grade of schooling completed by 
individual, highest average grade completed 
for married households 













I if household was a single male in 1992, 0 
otherwise 
I if household was married or living together 
in 1992, 0 otherwise 
I if household head is African American, 0 
otherwise 
I if household head is Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
I if household head is Other, 0 otherwise 






Th is chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the sample characteri stics. The next secti on reports the results of 
independent /tests comparing unleveraged and leveraged households across 
continuous variab les. This section is followed by the resu lts of the chi-square tests for 
independence on categorical variables. The chapter concludes with a presentation of 
the regression models generated for each of the dependent vari ab les. 
Sample Characteri stics 
The final sample of continuously participating households with constant 
marital sta tuses from 1992 to 2002 with housing assets consisted of 3,060 households. 
As a resu lt of missing values ford fin ed benefi t and defined contribution pensions, an 
additiona l 2 12 and 53 cases, respectively, were dropped from the sample. Fifteen 
households refused to report th ei r work status in 1992 and 2002, these were also 
dropped from the final sample. Ten addi tional cases were treated as influential 
leverage cases and eliminated from the sample. The final sample consisted of2,770 
households. All doll ar figures were adjusted to be 2002 equivalent dollars. For 
sample stati stics, means testing, and chi-square tests, the 1992 household 
weights- included with the data set- were applied to the households . Household 
weights provided by HRS were not app li ed in the regress ion analysis. 
Average househo ld assets increased substan tially over the period of 
observation. Mean assets increased $405,510. The median household 's assets 
increased S 179,2 50. Based on the observed standard deviation for the results, there 
was substantial variation among households in tenns of both abso lute and percent 
increases. In contrast to household assets, average total resources avai lable to the 
house decreased by $270,780. Similar to household assets, substantial variation 
across households was observed. These results are summarized in Tab le 4.1. 
The increase in assets and the simultaneous decrease in total resources was 
consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis, in that prior to retirement, 
househo lds accumulated assets, however, their human capital- measured by the 
present value of future eamings-declined as a result of fewer anticipated years of 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Stalislicsfor Changes in Assels and Total Resources from 1992 lo 2002 
ei hied) 
Dependent Variables Mean (Median) SD 
Assets (OOOs) 
1992 401.97 (220.24) 65 1.03 
2002 807.48 (465.94) I ,452.98 
Change in assets 405.51 (179.25) 1,289.55 
Total resources (OOOs) 
1992 I ,544.50 (I ,087.16) 2,043.34 
2002 1,273.7 1 (793.36) 2,254.67 
Change in total resources -270.78 (-272.28) 1,313.92 
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work. The present value of public and private defined benefit pensions was also 
reduced as the household ages because they have fewer years left to draw on life 
pensions. A breakdown of total resources is presented in Table A.l of the Appendix. 
lnitial amounts of mortgage debt and changes in that debt were reported in 
Table 4.2. Just Jess than one third of the sample reported no mortgage debt in 1992 
and 2002. Over the period of observation 43.95% of households kept or incurred 
mortgage debt wh ile 25.49% decreased their mortgage debt. 
Average household income from all sources in 199 1 was $70,796, as reported 
in Table 4.3 . The higher income was a resu lt of the sample selection process. The 
average all ocati on of non-housing assets to risky assets was 34.69%. 
The median percentage of assets al located to ri sky investments was 30.77. 
More than one fifth of the households received an inheritance during the period of 
observati on and 14.59% of households, when asked in 1992, definitely planned 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Mortgage Debt (i-om 1992 to 2002 (Weighted) 
Variables Mean (Median) SD % 
1992 Housing debt (OOOs) 
Mortgage debt to assets (x I ,000) 
Change in housing debt 
Paid off 
Kept or borrowed 









to leave a sizable estate to their heirs, whereas 49.55% thought that it was not likely 
that they wou ld leave a sizable estate. Median household consumer debt was zero in 
1992. 
Self-rated health and other demographic variab les are reported in Table 4.4. 
The majority of households in the sample reported hav ing "Excellent" or "Very 
Good" health with only 13.66% reporting "Fair or Poor" hea lth, as shown on Table 
Table 4.3 
Descriplive S!afislics far Household Income, Risky Assels, 01her Deb!, and 
lnherilcmces from 1992 lo 2002 (Weighled) 
Variables 
1991 income (OOOs) 
Work trend 
Working 1992: not working 2002 
Not working 1992 : working 2002 
Not working 1992: not working 2002 
Working 1992: working 2002' 
Ri sky assets to total assets (x 1 00) 
1992 other debts (OOOs) 
Received inheritance 






Mean (Median) SD 
70.80 (56.46) 64.75 
34.69 (30.77) 30.79 













4.4. Self-reported health status in 2002 was unchanged for 49.11% of the sample. A 
large percentage, 39.04%, of the sample reported lower self-rated health in 2002 than 
in 1992. This was not surprising given that these households were 10 years older and 
the high percentage of households reporting "Excellent" or "Very Good" health in 
1992. 
Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Household Health and Demographics from 1992 to 2002 
(Wei hted) 
Mean 
Variables (Median) SD % 
1992 self-reported health status 
Excellent 14.20 
Very Good 40.81 
Good 31 .33 
Fair or Poor" 13.66 
Change in self-reported health 
No change 49.10 
1m proved 11.86 
Decl ined' 39.04 
1992 household size 2.40 (2 .00) 1.03 










Man·ied or partnered' 
Race 




' Reference category. 
Mean 
(Median) 











The average household size was 2.40 individuals per household . The 
relatively large household size for this age group was a result of the restriction placed 
on the ending sample. The average age of the household in 1992 was 57.59 years old. 
This was slight ly older than the midpoint of the HRS sample because spouses of age-
el igible indiv iduals were included in the household sample. The average education of 
the household indicated some post-secondary education for the individuals. The 
majority of the sample was married whi le single men accounted for only 5.56% of the 
group. The sample was overwhelmingly non-Hispanic White. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the mean and median trends in household assets 
and total resources, respectively, for the period of observati on. An upward-sloping 
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trend was observed for average and median household assets. Both mean and median 
household assets experienced increases over the period 2000 to 2002. During this 
same period, the overall U.S. economy was stagnant and equity investments were 
generally declining in value. However, bond values increased dramatically during this 
period as a result of falling interest rates and weak stock market perforynance. Home 
prices also experienced substantial increases during this time period. 
While households did well during the 2000 to 2002 time period, the median 
households' assets experienced modest growth from 1994 to 2000, a period which saw 
exceptional growth in the stock market. The counter intuitive trend in assets during 
times of rapid gains and losses in the stock market suggests that households in this age 
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Figure 4.1. Household assets from 1992 to 2002 (weighted). 
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assets were not allocated to ri sky assets, such as stocks, but rather were held in more 
conservative investments, such as bonds. The ratio of risky assets to non-housing 
assets strengthens this explanation. 
IJ1 contrast to Figure 4.1 is Figure 4.2 , which shows a steady decrease in the 
total resources of the household at both the mean and median measure~. The most 
influential factor contributing to the steady decline of total resources was the sample' s 
age. As the sample aged, the present va lue of future eamings and public and private 
defined benefit pension plans decreased. It appears that for househo lds in this age 
group , the decline in total resources as a resu lt in age occurred at a greater rate than 
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Figure 4.2. Household total resources from 1992 to 2002 (weighted). 
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Figure 4.3 depicts the mean and median trend in mortgage debt during the 
period of observation. Two groups of househo lds are apparent in Figure 4.3 , namely, 
those households with mortgage debt, versus those households without mortgage debt. 
Jn 2002 do ll ars, average mortgage debt has remained relatively constant. However, as 
seen in Table 4.8, the percentage of households with zero mortgage debt in 2002 was 
higher than in 1992, yet the average mortgage debt appears to be stable. As shown in 
Table 4.6, the average amount of mortgage debt, in real terms, for borrowing 
households increased substant iall y from 1992 to 2002. 
Complementing Figure 4.3 is Figure 4.4, which shows the mean mortgage debt 
to assets ratio and mean mortgage debt to total resources ratio over the time period. 
While average mortgage debt appeared to remain constant, the ratio of mortgage debt 
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Figure 4.3. Mortgage debt (OOOs) from 1992 to 2002 (weighted). 
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ln general, even households that did not pay down their mortgage debt during the time 
period saw their leverage ratios fall. 
The trend in mortgage debt to to tal resources initially follows the ratio of 
mortgage debt to assets, however, as th e sample aged and total resources were 
depleted more rapidl y than assets were accumul ated, the household began to become 
more leveraged. This is the opposite of the mortgage debt to assets ratio and b~ings to 
li ght the increasing leverage that older households take on when mortgage debt is held 
constant. 
Figure 4.5 depicts selected age col1ort s and the average amount of mortgage 
debt carri ed by each household for each year of observation. The age of the cohort 
was as of 1992. The amo unt of mortgage debt fell for each cohort during the 
160 -
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Figure 4. 4. Leverage ratios (x 1 ,000) fro m 1992 to 2002 (weighted). 
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first years of observation. The oldest cohort' s debt continued to decrease while the 
younger cohorts' average mortgage debt increased and decreased more sporadically 
over the remainder of the period. The youngest cohort consistently had the highest or 
near highest debt loads relative to the other coh011s while the oldest cohort 
consistentl y had the lowest amounts of mortgage debt. The differences between 
cohorts are consistent with the life cycle income hypothesis in that younger 
households carry more mortgage debt than older households. 
Younger cohorts appeared to be more responsive to changes in interest rates 
than older cohorts. Historically low interest rates from 2000 to 2002 appeared to have 
motivated younger households to increase their mortgage debt in real tenns. 
Consistent with the life cyc le income hypothesis, the oldest households appeared to be 
less responsive to changes in interest rates than younger households. However, for 
51-52 
57-58 
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Figure 4.5. Mean housing debt (OOOs) by age of oldest individ ual in 1992 from 1992 
to 2002 (weighted). 
some older households the fa ll ing interest rates appeared to have slowed the rate at 
which mortgage debt was declining. ln general, the younger cohorts increased or 
maintained mortgage debt holdings, while the two oldest cohorts decreased or 
maintai ned mortgage debt balances. 
Comparison ofUnleveraged and Leveraged Households 
Independent t-Test Results 
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The sample was di vided into two subgroups: those households without 
mortgage debt and those with mortgage debt in 1992. The creation of subgroups was 
repeated in 2002 . Table 4. 5 con tains the results of the independent t tests comparing 
1992 group means along selected continuous variables . Unleveraged households 
accounted for 36. 10% of the total sample in 1992. Statistically significant differences 
existed between leveraged and unleveraged households. Leveraged households in 
1992 were stati sti ca lly signi fi can tly younger than unleveraged households and had 
stati sti cally signifi cantly higher household incomes, education, total resources, 
consumption debt, and household size than unleveraged households. 
Leveraged households also experi enced stati stically significantly larger 
decreases in total resources over the subsequent peri od of observation. Unleveraged 
households reported statistically signi fican tly higher assets. The higher income, 
younger age, and higher total resources of the leveraged group may be indicati ve of a 
larger percentage of the subgroup work ing. 
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Table 4.5 
Results of Independent t tests Comparing the Leveraged and Unleveraged Households 
by Continuous Variables in 1992 and for the Period from 1992/o 2002 (Weighted) 
Households 
Un leveraged Leveraged 
(36. 10%) (63.90%) 
Mean Mean 
Variable (SD) (SD) 1 score 
Assets (OOOs) 438.05 381.59 2.30* 
(693.79) (624.85) 
Change in assets($, OOOs) 349.85 436.94 -1.79 
(1,178.80) (I ,347.36) 
Total resources (OOOs) 1,314.85 1,674.18 -4.68*** 
(2,396.33) (1 ,801.70) 
Change in total resources($ , OOOs) -151.65 -338.06 3.77*** 
(I ,033.58) (I ,444.38) 
Mortgage debt (OOOs) 0.00 69.55 -24.68*** 
(0 .00) (93.43) 
1991 household income (OOOs) 57.06 78.55 -8.9 1*** 
(57.98) (67.06) 
Risky asset allocation (%) 33.43 35.40 -1.70 
(30.49) (30.95) 
Other debt (OOOs) 1.72 4.17 -4.49** * 
(11.93) (I 5. 79) 
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Mean Mean 
Variable (SD) (SD) t score 
1992 household size 2.26 2.49 -5.80*** 
(0.93) ( 1.08) 
Age 58.83 56.88 11.60*** 
( 4.80) (4.25) 
Education level 12.20 13.1 7 -1 0.12*** 
(2.70) (2.48) 
*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001. 
Table 4.6 compares un leveraged and leveraged households in 2002 along the 
same variables used in Table 4.5 . l.n 2002, 56.06% of the sample had no mortgage 
debt. There were no statistically significant differences in the amount of assets held or 
the change in assets over the preceding period of observation between the two groups. 
Several of the differences observed in 1992 remained in 2002 . Leveraged households 
continued to be statistically significantly younger and also have higher household 
incomes, education, and househo ld size. In 2002, leveraged househo lds did not have 
sta tistically sign ificant ly different total resources than unleveraged households, 
however, leveraged households experienced a statistically significantly larger decrease 
in total resources during the preceding I 0 years compared with unleveraged 
households. Leveraged households had statisticall y significantly more consumer debt 
in 2002 than unleveraged households. 
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Table 4.6 
Results of independent t rests Comparing the Leveraged and Unleveraged Households 
bJ! Continuous Variables in 2002 and for the Period (rom 1992 to 2002 (Weighted) 
Households 
No debt Debt 
(56.06%) (43.94%) . 
Mean Mean 
Variable (SD) (SD) t score 
Assets (OOOs) 86 1.61 738.43 2.32* 
(1 ,7 17.49) (1,017.10) 
Change in assets($, OOOs) 444.01 356.4 1 1.86 
(I ,500.07) (954.35) 
Total resources (OOOs) 1,264.67 1,285.25 -0.25 
(2,682.83) (1 ,546.1 2) 
Change in total resources($, OOOs) -123.00 -459.26 7.07** * 
(1 ,401.45) ( 1,166.65) 
Mortgage debt (OOOs) 0.00 79.76 -30.34*** 
(000) (108.65) 
2001 household income (OOOs) 62.11 80.4 1 -5 .17*** 
(97.72) (96. 17) 
Risky asset allocat ion (%) 33.98 35.60 -1.45 
(30.39) (3 1.29) 
Other debt (OOOs) 2.53 4.37 -2.76** 
(19. 12) (17.25) 
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Mean Mean 
Variable (SD) (SD) 1 score 
2002 household size 2.08 2.31 -6.93*** 
(0.80) (1.06) 
Age 58.54 56.36 13.53*** 
(4.65) (4 .11 ) 
Education in years 12.53 13.19 -7.04*** 
(2.62) (2.53) 
*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001. 
Chi-square Tests of Independence 
Simi lar to the analysis perfonned for continuous va riables in 1992 and 2002, 
chi-square tests of independence were perfonned comparing unleveraged and 
leveraged households in 1992 and 2002 for categorical variables. The results shown 
in Table 4. 7 are similar to those shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in that stati sti cally 
signifi cant differences between unleveraged and leveraged households ex isted. 
Leveraged households differed fro m unleveraged households based on their 
wo rk trend over the period of observati on, whether they received an inheritance during 
the period of observation, initial tota l resources, bequest expectations, self-rated 
health , changes in health status, changes in household size, and race. Consistent with 
the res ults presented in Table 4.5, leveraged households were more likely to be 
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Table 4.7 
Results of Chi-Square Tests af Independence Comparing the Leveraged and 
Unleveraged Households by Categorical Variables in 1992 and for the Period from 
1992 to 2002 (Weighted) 
Households 
No debt Debt 
Variable (36 .10%) (63.90%) x2, df 
Change in mortgage debt 2,408.94*** ,2 
Kept or borrowed 15.29 60.14 
Paid off 0.00 39.86 
No mortgage debt' 84.71 0.00 
Work status 98.40***' 3 
Working to not working 43 .3 1 40.27 
Not worki ng to work ing 2.46 1.80 
Not working to not working 21.38 10.37 
Working to working' 32.85 47.56 
Initial total resources percentile 109.00***, 4 
25'h to 50'h 24.91 24.09 
50'h to 75'h 2 1.45 24.55 
75'h to 90'h 10.64 15.97 
90'h to 1 OO'h 5.45 12.69 
0 to 25'h' 37.55 22.70 
Received inheritance 18.91 23.57 8.95**, I 
Likelihood of leaving an estate 2 1.83***, 3 
Definitely 16. 11 13.71 
Probably 21.11 18.39 
Poss ibly 17.65 15.51 
101 
Variable No debt Debt x',df 
Definitely or probably not' 45.13 52.39 
lnitial health status 62.92***' 3 
Excellent 9.91 16.64 
Very good 36.9 1 43.04 
Good 34.91 29.28 
Fair or poor' 18.27 11.04 
Change in health status 6. 19*, 2 
Maintained 51 .59 47.71 
Improved 12.10 11.71 
Declined' 36.31 40.58 
Change in household size 30.26***, 2 
Increased 9.91 12.22 
Decreased 23.73 31.54 
No change' 66.36 56.24 
Coupled status 1.61' 2 
Single female 17 09 15 .31 
Single male 5.45 5.60 
Married' 77.45 79.10 
Race 17 .30**, 3 
African American 5.18 7.76 
Hispanic 5.09 3.29 
Other 1.1 8 2.26 
White' 88.55 86.70 
' Reference category. 
*p < .05., **p < .0 1., ***p < .001. 
work ing in 1992 and 2002 than un leveraged households. Higher proportions of 
unleveraged households reported not working in both 1992 and 2002. 
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Stati stica ll y significant differences in initial total resources also distinguished 
the two gro ups. Consistent with results fro m Table 4.5, higher proportions of 
leveraged households were observed in the highest two total resources percentile 
brackets, whereas, larger proportions ofunleveraged households were observed in the 
lowest percentile category. Leveraged househo lds were much more likely than 
un leveraged households to have received an inheritance during the time period. 
Expectations to leave a sizable estate were higher among unleveraged households 
Higher percentages of leveraged households reported "Excellent" or "Very 
Good" hea lth as well as experiencing a decli ne in health over the period. The number 
of individuals in a household was less stab le among leveraged households than 
unleveraged households during the period of observati on with larger proport ions of 
leveraged households experiencing an increase or decrease in household size relative 
to unleveraged households . Higher percentages of Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
Whites were observed in the unleveraged group while African Americans and Other 
races were over represented among leveraged households. 
Several of the difference in categorical variables that were observed in 1992 
between leveraged and unleveraged households continued to be observable in 2002. 
Table 4.8 presents the results of chi-square tests of independence on the same 
categorical vari ab les in 2002 . Statistica ll y signifi cant di fference remained in work 
status trends, initial total resources, bequest expectations, health status, changes in 
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household size, and race. Looking back over the period from 2002, stat istically 
significant differences in coupled status were also observable with higher percentages 
of single households categorized as unleveraged and married households belonging to 
the leveraged group. 
Over half of the leveraged households in 2002 reported workin_g in 1992 and 
2002 and only 33.90% of unleveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002. 
Leveraged households were more likely to be working than unleveraged households . 
Complementing the household ' s work status was its abili ty to work. Higher 
proportions of leveraged households continued to report "Excell ent" or "Very Good" 
health relative to unleveraged households. 
Similar to differences observed in 1992, larger proportions of leveraged 
households belonged to higher initial total resources percentiles than unleveraged 
households. This was largely a result of leveraged households being much more 
likely to be working compared to unleveraged households, thus having higher present 
values of future earnings. While leveraged households generally had greater total 
resources, bequest expectations were more likely to be higher among unleveraged 
households. 
Leveraged househo lds remained more Jluid than un leveraged househo lds with 
higher proportions reporting changes in household size over the period. Statistically 
significant differences in the racial and ethn ic composition of leveraged and 
unleveraged households remained in 2002. African Americans and Other households 
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Table 4.8 
Results of Chi-Square Tests of Independence Comparing the Leveraged and 
Unleveraged Households by Categorical Variables in 2002 and for the Period from 
1992 to 2002 (Weighted2 
Households 
No debt Debt 
Variable (56.04%) (43 .96%) x2,df 
Change in mortgage debt 3,046.00***, 2 
Kept or borrowed 0.00 100.00 
Paid off 45.46 0.00 
No debt' 54.54 0.00 
Work status 123.59***, 3 
Working to not working 46.43 34.88 
Not working to working 1.76 2.39 
Not working to not working 17.92 9.86 
Working to working' 33.90 52.88 
Initial wealth percentile 100.92***, 4 
25 '" to 50'" 27.05 20.99 
50'" to 75'" 22.72 24.35 
75'" to 90'" 10.71 18.30 
90'" to 1 00'" 7.20 13.82 
0 to 25'"' 32.32 22.55 
Received inheritance 21.49 22.40 0.37, 1 
Likelihood of leaving an estate 12.07*, 3 
Definitely 15.47 13.45 
Probably 20.21 18.31 
Possibly 16.81 15.62 
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Variable No debt Debt x',df 
Definitely or probably not' 47.51 52.62 
Health status in 2002 21.57***,3 
Excellent 4.34 6.27 
Very good 30.70 34.80 
Good 41.42 41.22 
Fair or poor' 23.55 17.70 
Change in health status 3.37, 2 
Maintained health 50. 15 47.80 
Health improved 12.24 11.35 
Health declined' 37.61 40.85 
Change in household size 50.93***, 2 
Increased 10.60 12.41 
Decreased 24.06 34.68 
No change' 65.34 52.91 
Coupled status 6.92*, 2 
Single female 16.04 15.83 
Single male 6.50 4.33 
Married' 77.46 79.84 
Race 16.52**, 3 
Afri can Ameri can 5.5 1 8.51 
Hispanic 3.93 3.96 
Other 1.35 2.46 
White' 89.22 85.06 
*p < .05., **p < .01. , ***p < .001. , 
were over represented among leveraged househo lds relati ve to unleveraged 
households. 
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Based on the results of independent t tests and chi -square tests there were 
statisti ca lly signifi cant differences between leveraged and unleveraged househo lds. 
The general difference between the two groups was that greater proporti ons of 
leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 than unleveraged households. 
This observation was supported by the differences in earned income, work status 
trends, age, tota l resources, and changes in total resources. However, wi th respect to 
asset holdings and changes in assets the find ings were mi xed. Subgrouping 
households based on mortgage debt status in 1992 resulted in no statisti ca l differences 
in assets or subsequent changes in assets. ln contrast, subgrou ping households based 
on 2002 mortgage debt status and look ing back, un leveraged households had 
stati stically signifi cant ly higher assets, however, there was no statisti cal difference in 
the change in assets between the two groups. 
Robust Regress ion Resul ts 
The results of the robust regression analysis were mi xed. The results of the 
logit model used to contro l for non-random att rition leading to sample se lecti vi ty bias 
are reported in Tab le 4.9. The results of the logit model were then incorporated into 
the robust regression models by way of the independent vari able lambda. Based on 
lambda ' s significance in the first model, sample se lect ivity bias was present in the 
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model and was corrected. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients were adjusted 
to reflect the inclusion of lambda and the robust weights in the models. 
Table 4.9 
Logistic Regression Resulrs used to Comrol for Sample Selecliviry Bias (sample 
a//rilion) (rom 1992 ro 2002 (n = 5,869) 
Variables 
Married or partnered 
Children at home 
Age of individual, or oldest spouse, in 1992 
Poor health 
Received welfare assistance in 1991 











































Table 4.10 presents the results for the estimated model for absolute changes in 
household assets. The first column of numbers in Table 4.10 is the estimated 
coeffici ent and significance obtained using OLS regression. The next three columns 
report the estimated model using robust regression. Both models were presented so 
that differences in the two models can be observed. The reported R2 value is only 
applicable to the OLS results. The R2 va lue for robust regression is not directly 
comparable to OLS results and was not reported. 
Keeping or incurring mortgage debt, relative to households that did not have a 
mortgage over the period, was statist ically significant and negati vely related to 
changes in assets. Households that kept their mortgage debt or incurred new mortgage 
debt had assets dec line $62 ,850 compared to households without mortgage debt in 
1992 and 2002, all other factors held constant. Nei ther initial mortgage debt, or the 
square of initial mortgage debt were statistica ll y significant. Paying off mortgage debt 
during the period was not stat isti cally di fferent fro m not having a mortgage during the 
period. 
Total household income in 1992 was stati sticall y significant and positively 
related to changes in total household assets. Beginning the period with one or more 
respondents working and ending the period with all household respondents retired , 
compared to households that began and ended the period working, was statistically 
significant and positively related to changes in assets. 
Receiving an inheritance, re lat ive to not receiving an inheritance, was 
positively associated wi th changes in assets. The household's initial total resources 
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Table 4.10 
Robust Regression Results for the Change in Household Assets from 1992/o 2002 
(n=2, 770 
OLS Robust 
Variables B B SEE t score 
Household leverage 
1992 debt ratio (x I 000) -0.17 0.06 0.43 0.17 
Change in ratio' 
Paid off -2 .25 -26.81 19.24 -1.38 
Kept or borrowed -168.83* -62.85 18.89 -3.31 ** 
1992 debt ratio squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 
Income and work 
1991 income (in OOOs) 1.16* 0.78 0.18 4.39*** 
Work status (working to working") 
Working to not working 100.88 60 04 14.40 4.16*** 
Not working to working 81.39 32.52 41.16 0.78 
Not working to not working 166.39 36.65 20.92 1.77 
l11iti al wealth and portfolio 
1992 total resources (0 - 25'h ' ) 
25'h- 49'h 
-2.15 -6.27 18.15 -0.34 
50'h - 74'h 40.41 10.10 20.14 0.51 
75'h- 89'h 65.95 27.62 24.84 1.11 
90'h -100'h 277.70* 58.32 32.05 1. 81 
Risky assets to total assets -0.15 -0.11 0.27 -0.42 
1992 other debts (in OOOs) 6.66*** -0.61 0.46 -1.30 
Inheritance 
Received inheritance 76.54 40.36 15 .99 2.51 * 
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OLS Robust 
Variables B B SEB t score 
Leave estate (not likely') 
Definit ely 157.1 9 22.34 19. 10 1.15 
Probably 111.18 18.53 16.79 1.10 
Possib ly 47.23 -4.70 17.48 -0.28 
Health 
1992 health (fair or poor') 
Excellent -0.99 -13.93 33. 19 -0.42 
Very good -80.94 4.68 27.85 0.1 6 
Good -58.84 -20.82 24.58 -0.85 
Change in health (decl ined') 
No change 53.58 29.90 14.77 2.00* 
Improved 80.02 11.49 22.83 0.49 
Demographics 
1992 household size -45.42 -9.22 9.32 -0.99 
Change in size (constant') 
Increased - 18.88 8.26 19. 16 0.44 
Decreased 45 .60 17. 10 19. 19 0.89 
Age 3.96 3.92 2.34 1.67 
Educati on 24.42* 13 .52 3.37 3.99*** 
Interactions 
Debt ratio X educati on -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.12 
Debt ratio X income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 19 
Debt ratio X risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.62** 
Debt ratio X age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.1 I 
OLS Robust 
Variables B B SEB t score 
Coupled status (manied') 
Single female -90.52 -17.48 23.03 -0.76 
Single male -85.45 37.89 33.42 1.14 
Race (Non-Hispanic White' ) 
African American 8.71 4.68 22.42 0.20 
Hispanic -41.74 -11.03 31.96 -0.35 
Other 177.84 38.53 58.86 0.64 
Lambda -730.23 -250.45 106.76 -2.34* 
Model constant 261.13 -106.54 122.21 -0.86 
Note . R1 = .052 is the model fit for the OLS model using unweightcd data. The 
corresponding F statistic, F = 3.92***, is also associated with the OLS results. 
Corresponding stati stics are not reported for the robust model. 
'Reference category. 
*p < .05. , **p < .01., ***p < .00 1. 
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percentile categori zation was not statistically significantly associated wi th changes in 
assets in the robust model nor was a household's al location to risky assets. 
Initial health status was not a statistically signi ficant variable in the estimated 
model. However, change in health status was statisticall y significant and was 
substantial ly related to changes in assets. Experiencing constant health in 1992 and 
2002, relative to declining health was positively associated with changes in assets. 
Households wi th constant health reported a $29,900 greater increase in assets than 
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households with declining health . Education was also statistically significant and 
substantially related to changes in assets. Each additional year of schooling increased 
changes in assets by $13,520, all other things equal. 
The interacti on between the ratio ofmm1gage debt to total assets and the 
households risky asset allocation was positive. This was consistent with the 
theoretical model in that households can potentially earn higher rates of return than 
the interest rate charged on mortgage debt and wou ld experience a positive net 
increase in wealth. 
The foll owing model was estimated for the absolute change in total resources, 
Tab le 4.11, for the period of observation. Consistent with the previous results,. 
keeping or incurring mortgage debt during the period, relative to not having mortgage 
debt , was negatively assoc iated wi th changes in total resources. Also consi stent with 
the previous model , neither the initial leverage ratio, or square of the initial leverage 
ratio were statisti cally signifi cant. Households eliminating mortgage debt during the 
period were not statistically different from households without mortgage regarding 
changes in total resources for the period . 
Belonging to a household that began the period working and then stopped 
working prior to 2002, relative to those households working in both 1992 and 2002, 
was positively associated with changes in total resources. Not working in 1992 or 
2002, relative to households that were work ing in 1992 and not working in 2002, was 
posi ti vely associated with changes in total resources. This is a reflection of the 
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Table4.ll 
Robust Regression Results for the Change in Household Total Resources from 1992 to 
2002 (n = 2, 770) 
OLS Robust 
Variables B B SEE t score 
Household leverage 
1992 debt ratio (x 1 000) 0.51 0.04 129.92 0.09 
Change in ratio' 
Paid off 25 .37 -12.78 20.45 -0.62 
Kept or borrowed -168.02* -47.70 20.13 -2.36* 
1992 debt ratio squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 
Income and work 
1991 income (in OOOs) -0.88 -0.10 0.20 -0.50 
Work status (working to working') 
Working to not working 122.17* 122.67 15.31 8.00*** 
Not working to working 144.02 81.3 1 45.07 1.80 
ot work ing to not working 267.95*** 164.22 22.45 7.3 1*** 
Initial wea lth and portfolio 
1992 total resource (0 - 25'h ') 
25'h- 49'h 
-2 19.88** -209.64 19.42 -1 0.80*** 
50'h- 74'h 
-3 19.02*** -385.06 21.65 -17.80*** 
75'h - 89'h 
-585.83*** -658.13 26.26 -25.07*** 
90'h- lOO'h 
-1 ,178.76*** -962 .44 34.15 -28. 13*** 
Risky assets to total assets 1.46 0.93 0.28 3.27** 
1992 other debts (in OOOs) 8.38*** -0.02 0.49 -0.05 
Inheritance 
Received inheritance 72.01 37.40 16.98 2.21* 
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OLS Robust 
Variables B B SEE t score 
Leave estate (not likely") 
Definitely 218.19** 52.33 20.36 2.56* 
Probably 94.56 61.83 17.90 3.45** 
Possibly I 04.40 16.31 18.60 0.87 
Health 
1992 health (fair or poor') 
Excellent -30.85 -54.14 35.53 -1.53 
Very good -108.16 -33.22 29.83 -1.11 
Good -88.13 -50.66 26.42 -1.92 
Change in health (dec lined') 
No change 21.71 23.66 15.68 1.51 
Improved 29.54 18.67 24.21 0.77 
Demographics 
1992 household size -45.33 -4.82 10.02 -0.47 
Change in size (constant') 
Increased 11.80 6.84 20.60 0.33 
Decreased 22.90 -3.21 20.45 -0.16 
Age 2.76 2.64 2.50 1.05 
Education 32.01** 13.01 3.6 1 3.59*** 
Interactions 
Debt ratio X education -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -2.14* 
Debt ratio X income 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.98* 
Debt ratio X risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 
Debt ratio X age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.44 
OLS Robust 
Variab les B B SEB t score 
Coupled status (married') 
Single female -2.58 49.36 24.82 2.00* 
Single male -86.40 5.87 36.13 0. 17 
Race (Non-Hispanic White' ) 
African American -47.61 -39.36 24.21 -1.62 
Hispanic 14.94 -13.20 34.55 -0.39 
Other 256.44 122.81 62.86 1.96 
Lambda -588.70 -130.08 11 4.9 1 -1.13 
Model constant -53 .81 -346.01 129.92 -2.66** 
Note. R2 = .I 04 is the model fit for the OLS model using unweighted data . The 
coJTesponding F statistic, F = 8.353***, is also associated with the OLS results. 
Co JTesponding stati stics are not reported for the robust model. 
'Reference category. 
*p < .05., **p < .01., ***p < .001. 
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growth of household assets over the period since non-working households in 1992 had 
little or no portion of total resources derived from future earnings. Havi ng in itial total 
resources in any percentile other than the 0 to 25'h was negatively related to both 
percent and absolute changes in total resources, largely reflecting the greater ini tial 
potential for decreases in total resources. 
The household's allocation of non-housing assets to risky investments was 
positively related to changes in total resources avai lab le to the household. However, 
the estimated effect of risky asset allocation on changes in total resources was 
re latively small. 
Receiving an inheritance, relative to not receiving an inheritance was 
positively assoc iated with changes in total resources, and based on the robust 
regression estimates increased total reso urces by $37,400, all other factors being 
equal. 
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Similarly, bequest expectations were also statistically significantly associated 
wi th changes in tota l resources. Compared to households that thought it un likely that 
they would leave a sizeable estate to their heirs, households definitely and probably 
expecting to leave a sizable estate were positively related to changes in total resources. 
Education was also pos iti vely assoc iated with changes in total reso urces. A 
one unit increase in the highest year of schoo ling completed resulted in an increase in 
total resources over the 10-year period of$13,010, based on the estimated robust 
coeffi cient. 
The combination of the leverage ratio and educati on was negati ve ly associated 
wi th changes in total resources, while the interaction of the leverage ratio and income 
was posi ti vely associated with changes in tot al resources. These results are partially 
consistent with Maki's (1995) findings in that high-income househo lds did benefit 
from the use of mortgage debt. However, Maki noted that it was particularly highl y 
educated high-income households that showed the greatest likelihood of maximizing 
the associated tax benefits of mortgage debt. In thi s study, the negative assoc iation 
between the combination of the leverage ratio and education is inconsistent with other 
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studies . Being a single female household, compared to married households, was 
negatively associated with changes in total resources. 
Table 4.12 presents in summary form the hypothesi zed and expected results 
for each variab le. The initial leverage ratio and square of the initial leverage ratio 
were not significant in the model, thus no support was found for tradeoff theory in 
households. The combination of househo ld leverage with other variables, specifically 
ri sky asset allocation and income, were consistent with the hypothesized results and 
supported the life cycle income hypothesis. The effects of the combined variables 
were consistent with the Equat ions 1.8 and 1.11. Both equat ions were derived from 
the life cyc le income hypothesis. Based on these results the life cycle income 
hypothesis appeared to dominate tradeoff theory in exp laining household leverage. 
Table4. 12 
Hypothesized and Actual Results for Changes in Assets and Total Resources Using 
Robust Regression (n = 2, 770) 
Assets Total resources 
Variable Hypoth. Actual Hypoth. Actual 
Household leverage 
1992 debt ratio (x I 000) + 0 + 0 
Change in ratio' 
Paid off 0 0 
Kept or borrowed + + 
1992 debt ratio squared 0 0 
Income and work 
1991 income (in OOOs) + + + 0 
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Assets Total resources 
Variable Hypoth. Actual Hypoth. Actual 
Work trend (working: working') 
Working: not working + + + 
Not worki ng: working 0 + 0 
Not working: not working 0 + + 
Initial wealth and portfolio 
1992 total resources (0 - 25'h ' ) 
25'h- 49'h + 0 + + 
so•h- 74'h + 0 + + 
75'h- 89'h + 0 + + 
90'h - ! OO'h + 0 + + 
Risky assets to total assets + 0 + + 
1992 other debts (in OOOs) 0 0 
Inheritance 
Received inheritance + + + + 
Leave estate (not likely') 
Definitely + 0 + + 
Probably + 0 + + 
Possibly + 0 + 0 
Hea lth 
1992 health (fair or poor') 
Excellent + 0 + 0 
Very good + 0 + 0 
Good + 0 + 0 
Change in health (declined') 
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Assets Total resources 
Variab le Hypoth. Actual Hypoth. Actual 
Constant + + + 0 
Improved + 0 + 0 
Demographics 
1992 household size 0 0 
Change in size (constant') 
Increased 0 0 
Decreased + 0 + 0 
Age + 0 0 
Education + + + + 
interactions 
Debt ratio X education + 0 + 
Debt rati o X income + 0 + + 
Debt ratio X risk + + + 0 
Debt ratio X age 0 0 
Coupled status (married') 
Single female 0 
Single male 0 0 
Race (Non-Hispanic White') 
African American 0 0 
Hispanic 0 0 
Other 0 0 
'Reference category. 
Retained or incurred mortgage debt duri ng the period of observation, relative 
to not havi ng mortgage debt, had a consistent negative effec t on changes in assets and 
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total resources. The in iti al leverage ratio and square of the initi al leverage ratio were 
not statist ically significant in either of the models. The effect of eliminating mortgage 
debt, relative to not having mortgage debt, on changes in assets and total resources 
was not statistically different from zero. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion of Results 
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Comparison of Leveraged and Unleveraged Households 
Leveraged and unleveraged households were stati sticall y significantly 
different from each other in several aspects in 1992 and 2002. A key distinguishing 
factor of the two groups was their apparent work status and human capital. In 1992, 
leveraged households had higher earned income, education, and total resources. 
Consistent wi th Grossman's (1973) find ings regarding health and work, a larger 
proportion of the leveraged households were working in 1992 and 2002 and also 
reported higher levels of self-rated hea lth. This contributed to the higher amount of 
total resources among leveraged households. 
The leveraged households in 1992 and 2002 were also statistically 
significantly younger, which gave them more time to work and accumulate resources, 
they also had larger households. The younger age and larger household size of the 
leveraged househo lds are consistent wi th the li fe cyc le income hypothesis, as well as 
the findings of Hanna and Rha (2000) and Chen and Jensen (1985). The leveraged 
households, as a result of their larger initial total resources and human capital, 
experienced a much larger reduction in total resources over the I 0 years than 
unleveraged households. However, the more abundant human capital among the 
leveraged households provided them with resources which could be converted to 
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financ ial capital. While the potential existed for greater savings among the leveraged 
group, there was no stati stica lly signi ficant difTerence in the change in assets between 
leveraged and unleveraged households. 
The younger cohorts in thi s study appeared to be carrying more mortgage debt 
in real terms later into life than earlier cohorts. Historically low intere~ t rates and 
rap idly appreciating home prices may have contributed to thi s. Another factor could 
have been that younger households are not as conservati ve as their older counterparts 
rega rding debt. A greater willingness may have been prevalent among the younger 
househo lds in the sample to carry debt into retirement rather than eliminate it. As the 
definition of retirement is continuously changi ng, younger households may have 
anti cipated a longer work ing life, and therefo re may have been more will ing to 
maintain or even increase their mortgage debt later in life. 
1.n 1992, the receipt o f an inheritance during the observed period was more 
likely to be among the leveraged households, while un leveraged households were 
more likely to expect to leave a sizab le estate. Looking back over the period of 
observation in 2002 and categorizing the househo lds based on leverage status in 2002, 
there was no statis ti cally signifi cant difference between the two groups regarding the 
receipt of an inheritance or the household 's expectation to leave a sizab le estate. 
One possible explanati on of the Jack of difference between the two groups in 
2002 with regards to mortgage debt, cou ld be that inheritance monies were used to pay 
off housing debt. Some households holding mortgage debt in 1992 were perhaps 
borrowing agai nst the expected proceeds of an anticipated inheritance. Such 
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households, after receiving the anticipated inheritance, then eliminated their debt 
holdings. These households, in the absence of the expected inheritance may have 
chosen to hold no mortgage debt during the period of observation . Similarly, the 
an ti cipated inheritance may also have served as the expected bequest among this 
group of households. Further research would be necessary to determine whether this 
was the case. 
Un leveraged households were also more likely to expect to leave a sizable 
inheritance to their heirs . The unleveraged house represents a large non-liquid asset 
that can be bequeathed to heirs during life or upon death. This finding was consistent 
with Kao and colleagues' (1997) finding that households with non-liquid assets were 
more likely to expect to leave an inheritance. 
Initially there was a cultural difference in carrying mortgage debt ; Hispanic 
households were more likely to be unleveraged. However, by the end of the 
observation period, African Americans were over represented among leveraged 
households. 
The resu lts were also consistent with Maki 's ( 1995) findings that more 
educated higher earners were more likely to incur home mortgage debt because of its 
tax advantages. ln this study, leveraged households had substantially higher 
household income than unleveraged households. Higher income generally results in 
higher tax rates for an individual thus the deduction of mortgage interest on personal 
income taxes would also be of greatest benefit to those individuals with the highest tax 
rates. The combination of mortgage debt and income was positively related to 
changes in total resources in the robust regression model- all other things equal, 
mortgage debt was advantageous in preserving total resources for high income 
households. 
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The stati stically significant difference in consumer debt in 1992 and 2002 may 
suggest a greater preference for cuiTent period consumpt ion among l e~eraged 
households. In 1992 and 2002 leveraged households had statistically signi licantly 
more consumer debt than unleveraged households. Greenspan's (2003) delineation of 
the uses of ex tracted home equity indicates that a large amount of mortgage debt was 
used for current consumption. lf mortgage debt was being used for consumption 
du ring the period, the observed negative relation between keeping or incuiTing . 
mortgage debt and changes in assets and total resources would be expected. 
In light of all of the differences taken together, the major underlyi ng 
divergence between leveraged and unleveraged households appears to be work status 
and human capital of the household. Those households still working were more 
inclined to be leveraged via mortgage debt than those households which were not 
working, or stopped working, and have relati vely lower amounts of human capital and 
total resources . 
Estimated Regression Models 
The estimated models for changes in assets and total resources provided no 
suppor1 for tradeoff theory when exp lai ning household leverage. Neither the initial 
leverage ratio nor the square of the in itial leverage ratio were significant in either of 
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the estimated models . A positive and concave relation between mortgage debt levels 
and changes in wealth was not supported by the findings. 
Support was found for the life cycle income hypothesis. The life cycle income 
hypothesi s in its simplest fom1 states that households will dissave or borrow when 
young, save in middle age, and then dissave in old age . The results of the comparative 
statistics and estimated regression models support the idea that households generally 
borrow and repay debt in accordance with work and life pattems. While there were 
positive benefits derived by some subgroups with mortgage debt, in general 
households were better off when borrowed funds were repaid rather than maintained, 
in order to potentially accumulate other fom1s of assets. ln this study the life cycle 
income hypothesi s was dominant over tradeoff theory. 
Based on the estimated regress ion model's results, when controlling for other 
factors, keeping or incurring mortgage debt had a negative impact on changes in assets 
and total resources, compared to not having mortgage debt. Household leverage in 
combination with other variables, such as income or risk tolerance, was positively 
associated with changes in assets and total resources. Households which paid off their 
mortgage debt during the observed period did not experience changes in total 
resources or assets statistica lly significantly different from households that did not 
hold mortgage debt during the period. ln other words, those households in the sample 
working towards e liminating mortgage debt experienced stati stically simi lar results to 
those households that did not have any mortgage debt. 
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Initial mortgage debt was not a statistically significant variable in either of the 
models. However, what households did with their mortgage debt over the subsequent 
I 0 year period appears to have been the important factor relating to mortgage debt. 
Households that paid off their mortgage experienced changes in assets and total 
resources stati sti cal ly similar to those households that did not have a 'l!ortgage during 
the period. Households that did not eliminate their mortgage debt during the period 
experienced less favorable changes in assets and total resources, relative to those 
households that did not have any mortgage debt during the period. This is an 
encouraging and important finding for consumers, financial educators, and other 
financial planners working with clients who wish to eliminate their mortgage debt. 
In general, household leverage appeared to be negat ively associated with 
changes in assets and total resources. However, household leverage, when combined 
with an addi ti onal variable, had a positive assoc iat ion with wealth gains. High-
income households with mortgage debt experienced positive benefi ts from mortgage 
debt relating to changes in total resources. Similarly, the combination of household 
leverage and the household's allocation of assets to risky investments (ownership 
investments) had a positive relation with changes in assets. These positive relations 
were consistent with the theoretical model il lustrat ing the marginal benefits of tax -
advantaged mortgage debt and leveraged risky investments. The posi tive benefits of 
the interaction variab les contrast the negative association of keeping or incurring 
mortgage debt relat ive to not having mortgage debt. This con trast underscored the 
caution that shou ld be exercised when using mortgages to potentially earn greater 
tl nancial gains. 
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ln general for this particular sample, households would have preserved or 
increased assets and total resources best by having no mortgage debt, rather than be 
leveraged over the period of observation. Exceptions to this were high-income or 
more risk-tolerant households that also held mortgage debt. This conc lusion was 
arrived at after observing a period of exceptional gains in the financial markets. 
Periods of less robust growth in the financ ial markets would likely result in similar 
and more pronounced results. 
The empirical findi ngs of this study regard ing mortgage debt and changes in 
assets and tota l reso urces were consistent with the hypothetical findings of Waggle 
and Johnson (2003). Waggle and Johnson recommended that households ' port folio 
decisions should consider mortgage debt, and that for moderately risk averse 
households, the opt imal al location to stocks would be substant ially less for households 
with mortgage debt. Waggle and Johnson also conc lude that households wi thout 
mortgage debt would be best served by remaining debt-free and not borrowing against 
their home for investment purposes. 
Education was stati sticall y significant in both estimated models and has a very 
substant ial effect on changes in assets and total resources. The substantial influence 
that education has on changes in wealth is consistent with human capital theory 
(Bryant, 1990). The education variable may also be capturing other latent 
characteristics of the household as well, such as: type of occupation, household health 
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behaviors, financial knowledge, and preferences. Educated households may be more 
likely to have less labor intensive jobs allowing them to cont inue in their jobs later 
into life. Similarly, health knowledge and behaviors may be more in line with 
recommended health practices, providing th em better objective health status than 
households with less fonnal education. And finally, education may also influence the 
household's knowledge and effectiveness regarding financial decisions and 
preferences that result in positive changes in household assets. 
There was a statistically significant relation between the interaction of 
education, mortgage debt, and changes in total resources. Contrary to hypothesized 
results and implications drawn from Maki's (1995) results, the relation was negatively 
associated with changes in total resources. The negative relation suggests that without 
the presence of an enab ling household characteristic such as higher income or higher 
risk tolerance, which were controlled for, the combination of mortgage debt and 
education was the same as keeping or incurring mortgage debt over the period of 
observation. 
This study provided some limited support for the health and wealth 
connection . Only the estimated model for the change in assets indicated that changes 
in hea lth status have an effect on changes in assets . The positive relation between 
having constant health and changes in assets, relative to households that reported 
decreased health, is consistent with the health-wealth coi1J1ection. Changes in health 
were not statisti cally significant in the estimated model for changes in total resources. 
The insignificance of health-related variables in the second model may partly have 
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been a result of how total resources were estimated. Actual , rather than expected, 
earni ngs over the period of observation were used to calculate the present value of 
future earnings. !f a household member experienced a loss of health which reduced 
their earning capacity over the observed time period, a reduction in total resources 
should also have been seen, assumi ng the loss of health was unforseen by the 
household . However, since actual earn ings were used over the ten-year period •. 
changes in earnings were treated as known at the beginning of the period, masking the 
effect of declining or improving health. 
The trend in work status reflected the household's decision to retire or exi t the 
labor market, reenter the labor market, or continue as retired, relative to those 
households that continued to participate in the labor force. Ex iting the labor market 
by di sab ility or retirement during the period of observation, or remaining retired 
during the period, relative to households that remained work ing during the period of 
observation, was positi vely related to changes in assets and total resources. The 
posi ti ve relation suggested that working households that later ex ited the labor market 
were effective in convert ing human capital to financial or real capital. The conversion 
of human capital to financial capital resulted in an overall increase in total resources 
available to the household , even though the household 's human capital, as measured 
by the present value of future earnings, had decreased significantly. 
Similarly, households that began and ended the period as retired had little, if 
any human capital, as measured in earned income, that would be lost over the period 
of observation. A chart depicting the change in total resources of reti red households 
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would likely look more simi lar to the chart shown in Figure 4 .1, than that shown in 
Figure 4.2. Strong financial markets over the period of observation contributed to the 
pos itive relation to changes in total resources enjoyed by this group. 
Based on these results, househo lds similar to those in this study wou ld have 
been better off to pay off their mortgage debt, rather than use it as financial leverage 
for investment purposes. Generally, households appeared to be ineffective in 
leveraging themselves for in vestment or financia l ga ins. Debt appeared to be more a 
function of life cycle stage-younger, worki ng, larger households-than of financial 
leverage for investment purposes. An exception to the general finding was that high-
income and more risk-tol erant households with mortgage debt appeared to experi ence 
larger increases in total resources and assets, respectively, than did unleveraged 
households. 
From the standpoint of maximizing resources, maintaining mortgage debt did 
not appear to be the best altemative fo r most households. However, for certain 
households mortgage debt was benefi cial and enhanced increases in assets and total 
resources. Whi le the use of mortgage debt for investment capital had the potenti al to 
increase total resources, the household may have derived greater satisfaction from 




Some key implications for consumers and financial professionals working 
with clients can be drawn from the results. Most notable is that consumers and 
professionals working with most consumers nearing retirement can have some 
confidence that mortgages shou ld be eliminated from the household 's portfolio rather 
than mai ntained. Househo lds appear to be ineffec tive in using leverage to ach i~ve 
greater asset gains. However, for more ri sk-tolerant and higher-income households 
mortgage debt may help to maximize resources available for retirement. Financial 
professionals shou ld refrain from making genera l recommendations, such as in books 
or popular press literature or on radio or TV talk shows, that would encourage the 
average household to keep mortgage debt rather than eliminate it. 
Resu lts of empirical studies cannot be app lied to specific individuals. 
Consequently consumers and financial professiona ls working with them should 
carefully eva luate the client' s ri sk tolerance and capac ity to success full y leverage their 
portfol ios, and a decision should be made based on specific analysis of the situation. 
As with the results o f any empirical research, exceptions exist. However, the deci sion 
to use mortgage debt for investment purposes should be carefully analyzed. 
Consumers and financial professionals working with clients should also 
consider how much of the borrowed funds wo uld be used for investment purposes, 
rather than consumption, and how those funds wou ld be invested. The most 
appropriate expected rates of retum for comparison would be the individual 's own 
experienced retum, based on their asset allocation mix. Hypothetical retums on 
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portfolios not currently utilized by the ind ividual should not be used in the comparison 
o f alternatives. 
Whi le not included in thi s study, some implications may be drawn relating to 
the Baby Boomers. First , younger cohorts in the study appeared to be carrying more 
mortgage debt; Baby Boomers may follow that same trend and continue to carry more 
mortgage debt later into life. Second, Baby Boomers may be more com fortable wi th 
the responsibil ity of managing their own assets in a 40 I (k) plan and consistent wi th 
Engen and Ga le ' s (1997) find ings, may leverage their 40J(k) accounts with mortgage 
debt. Third, given increasing life expectancies, the concept of reti rement continues to 
change, particularly for Baby Boomers who have time to plan and make arrangements 
for self-defined retirement. Thus, hi storical work patterns may no longer be rel evant 
to the Baby Boomers and the rapid decrease in human capital, as measured by the 
present va lue of future earnings, may not be as pronounced in thei r cohort . Based on 
the results of this study, worki ng households were more li kely to carry mortgage debt 
and if Baby Boomers adapt a retirement concept that includes some work , mortgage 
debt may be maintai ned much later in life. 
Policy implications derived from this analysis regarding mortgage debt and its 
favorab le tax status are limited largely because of the restricted nature of the sample. 
However, some implications can be noted. Mortgage debt in the near-retirement 
population is associated wi th negative changes in wealth . To promote self-sufficiency 
among a ll households, particularl y among those nearing or in retirement, policies 
should encourage households to eliminate mortgage debt prior to reti rement. 
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Under current tax policy, deductibility of mortgage interest may be an 
incentive to hold mortgage debt (Dunsky & Follain, 2000; Maki, 1995; Stango, 1999). 
If the tax code discrepancies in the treatment of consumer versus mortgage debt were 
eliminated, households might reduce their overall debt portfolios. The elimination of 
incentives, or subsidies, for mortgage debt may be a strong motivation for households 
to reduce mortgage debt. Consistent with other studies, this study found that high-
income households were more likely to carry mortgage debt than lower income 
households. This study also found that high-income households and households with 
greater allocations to risky assets derive positive benefits of mortgage debt regarding 
changes in wealth. 
While the el imination of subsid ies for mortgage interest may discourage 
mortgage debt in general, it may also make home ownership a more difficult goal to 
achieve for some households. Bourassa and Grigsby (2000) discussed the impact that 
eliminating the deductibili ty of mortgage debt wou ld have on home ownership rates, 
housing starts, and housing prices. They concluded that a phase out period of 15 to 20 
years would be sufficient to minimize or reduce any adverse effects of the po licy 
change. Furthennore, they argued that because high-income households are the main 
beneficiaries of the mortgage interest deduction, it is unlikely that lower income 
households, who have itemized expenses generally below the standard deduction, gain 
much if any marginal benefit from mortgage interest deductions. 
Because of the small effect mortgage interest deductibility has on home 
ownership rates, the concentration of benefits among higher income households, and 
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the negati ve relation between mortgage debt and wealth growth, policymakers should 
seriously reconsider the appropriateness of the mortgage interest deduction. Drawing 
from thi s study's findings, a diminishing incentive, or deductibility of mortgage 
interest, that wou ld offer the benefits of mortgage interest deductibility in the early 
years of home ownership when the interest expenses are the largest, and then 
gradually decrease to zero in later years of home ownership, would assist younger 
home owners in acq uiring and maintaining a home. A diminishing incentive would 
also discourage older home owners from keeping mortgage debt because of artificial , 
and perhaps unusable, incentives. 
Implementations of such policies are unlikely because they have the drawback 
of adding addi ti ona l complexit ies to an already overwhelming tax code. Additionally, 
such policy changes would surely be opposed by significant political interest groups, 
such as the banking and real estate industries, which regularly include the potential tax 
benefits of mortgage interest deductions in advertising and Joan solicitation material. 
Furthem1ore, because of the entrenched status of the mortgage interest deduction in 
the tax code, any attempt to change it wou ld require a long and dedicated political 
battle. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations of this study. First, the study is not generali zab le 
beyond the population of 51- to 61-year-olds in 1992. Second, while the HRS data 
contains a representative sample of 51- to 61-year-olds and their households residing 
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in the U.S. in 1992, the sub-sample used for this study does not. Specifically, thi s 
study used only households that did not experience a change in marital status during 
the period of observati on and that owned a home in 1992. Furthermore, the resulting 
sample, even after app lying the HRS provided weights, was not representative of 
African American and Hispanic households. Because of this limitation, conclusions 
drawn relative to Afri can American and Hispanic households may not be reli ab le nor 
representative of the total population. Even among the remaining sample, non-
Hispanic White households are over represented relative to their proportions in the 
overall population . Genera lizations beyond the sample population, particularly to 
African American and Hispanic households should be avoided as a result of the 
demographicall y non-representati ve sample. 
While the study examined the effec ts of mortgage debt on wealth, and how it 
was managed, there is no assurance that the households in the sample consciously 
made the choice of whether they would carry mortgage debt or not. Furthermore, 
whi le some attempt was made to distinguish between households that carried 
mortgage debt for consumption versus investment purposes, no clear di stinction could 
be achi eved, either because one did not ex ist, or the proxy variable was not adequate 
in iso lating the effects. 
The original HRS sample, as well as each subsequent sample wave, contains 
househo ld weights that, when app li ed, generate a nationa lly representative sample. 
Household weights in this study were applied for descriptive and comparative 
stati stics; however, HRS provided weights were not applied to the OLS regression 
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analysis. Separate weights were estimated for the robust regression analysis based on 
the end ing sample's characteristics. HRS weights were not used in the regression 
analysis because the end ing sample was not randomly selected from the original 
sample. Because of this, original sample weights may no longer accurately refl ect a 
nationally representative sample. The use of robust regression techniques in the data 
ana lysis effectively weigh ted the data on the basis of changes in assets or total . 
resou rces, wi th ex treme cases receiving a lower overall weight. The robust weights 
may be different from those provided with the HRS data. 
The original sample was also unique because defined contribution plans were 
becoming more popular amo ng employers during the peri od of observation, since the 
ri sks associated with retirement income were transferred to the employees. Prior to 
this point, the traditional defined benefit pension plan was the norm. Under the 
defined benefit pension plan individuals did not need to be knowledgeable about 
investments and other financial topics in order to ensure adequate resources at 
ret irement. However, with the increasing popularity of defined contribution plans, 
employees were forced to leam about investment related topics or naively participate 
in their employer's plan. Younger cohorts may have been more accustomed to 
defin ed contribution pensions and may have felt more confident and comfortable 
assuming the responsibi lity for managing their retirement assets. Because of this, the 
app lication of this age cohort's experiences is limited to those of the same cohort and 
shou ld not be extended to younger cohorts. 
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The period of observation was also unique. Record gains in the financial 
markets were observed, combined with periods of hi storically low interest rates on 
mort gage debt. Whi le unemployment rates were hi storically low, job turnover was 
relativel y high and the job tenure of labor market participants was relati vely short 
compared to historical job tenure periods (Su ll ivan et a!. , 2000) . Mortgage debt could 
have been used to smooth the transitions in employment. Similarly, because of the 
relative short job tenures, househo lds may not have des ired to pay down mortgage 
debt when they expected to relocate withi n a few years. These factors could have 
sign ifi can tly influenced the household 's decision regarding mortgage debt. 
The economy, although relatively stagnant during the last year of the 
observation period, enjoyed a period of unprecedented ex pansion and prosperity. The 
period of observation was also marked by rapid increases in bankruptcy filing rates in 
general and foreclosure rat es in certain areas. At first glance tradeoff theory would 
help to exp lain the increase in foreclosures and housing related bankruptcies, 
however, no evidence was found for this. Whi le there may be similar periods in the 
futu re, no two periods of observation wi II have the same overall experiences, and 
subsequent cohorts may experience peri ods more or less favorable than that observed 
in thi s study. 
Future Research 
Future research could look more closely at the more risk tol erant and highly 
compensated groups separately to detem1ine whether these households have greater 
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financial sophist ication with regard to mortgage debt for investment purposes. 
Previous studies suggested that these groups were different regarding investment risk 
and financial sophistication (Chen & Jensen, 1985; Grable & Lytton, 1998; Gutter, 
2000; Maki , 1995). 
The association between mortgage debt and employment status found in this 
study suggested the need for additional research on the relation between mortg~ge 
debt and transitions from the labor force to retirement. Studies examining the 
transitions from retirement back into the labor force may also benefit by including 
mortgage debt as an independent variable. ln general, the relation between mortgage 
debt and the pennanence of exits from the labor force may also be an applicable line 
of financial planning research. 
The large impact that human capital exhibited in this study may have hidden or · 
confounded certain relations that otherwise would have been present. Future research 
might look specifica ll y at retired households and the effects of mortgage debt on the 
change in household assets. Limiting the sample to retired households might create a 
more accurate model showing positive or negative relations which may yield direct 
implications for financial professionals work ing with retirees. 
The relation between hea lth status and mortgage debt may also be a fruitfu l 
area of future research. It may provide a means to examine households, through 
observed behavior, to dete1111ine what households are encumbering when they take out 
mortgage debt: the home itself, other financial and real assets, or future earnings . 
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Mortgage debt is an often substantial and unique element of a household's 
portfolio of assets and debts. How mortgage debt is managed can have a significant 
impact on the financial well-being of the home owners. Recent attention to mortgage 
debt reflects financial professionals' increasing awa reness of the important 
implications mortgage debt has for households. This study has furthered that 
literature wi th an empirical examination of mortgage debt' s impact on changes in 
assets and total resources . Future research could continue to clarify and broaden the 
existing body of literature to develop an accurate picture illustrating the relation 
between mortgage debt and the economic well-being of households. 
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Table A. I 
Breakdown o{Toial Resources in 1992 and 2002 in OOOs (Weighted2 
1992 2002 
Mean Mean 
Dependent variables (Median) SD (Median) SD 
Housing 170.58 163.40 204.9 1 230.95 
(121.90) (150.00) 
Stock, bonds, real estate, 137.77 368 .54 293.83 914.93 
business, IRNKeoghs (28.4 7) (65.00) 
Cash, checking, CO's, 24.03 60.51 60.86 191.37 
gov. savings bonds (7.00) {14.00) 
Other (vehicles, 32.88 96.8 1 130.03 607.23 
an nuities, life ins. , other) (12.00) (18.04) 
DC plan assets 27 .20 108.28 27.90 148.59 
(0.00) (0.00) 
PY of DB plan 235.87 546.62 171.72 395.38 
(20.33) (33.42) 
PY of Social Security 238.07 150.95 207.31 11 2.24 
(243.43) (207.33) 
PYofYA pensions 22.38 121. 11 14.79 72.8 1 
(0.00) (0.00) 
PV of future eamings 677.89 1,7 11.00 213 .51 1,289.75 
(296.06) (0.00) 
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1340. May 2002 - May 2003. 
Responsibilities: Developed and presented material for the online USU 
1340 Social Systems and Issues course. Introduced students to social 
sc ience research methods and how they are used to understand current 
soc ial issues. 
Supervi sor: Tom Lee, Ph.D. 
Research Assistant, Department of Family, Consumer, and Human Development. 
September 2001 - August 2002. 
Responsibilities: Assisted in researching, developing, and eva luating a 
gui debook to help late savers prepare for retirement. Presented 
guidebook and related materials at national conferences. The gu idebook 
was presented to the Nat ional Endowment for Financial Educat ion in 
accordance with the grant and is avail able on their website. 
Supervisor: Jean Lown, Ph.D. 
Audi tor, KPMG, Salt Lake City, UT. Jul y 2000 - August 2001. 
Responsibilities: Perfonned external financial audits on a variety of 
companies and organizati ons in the lntennountain region. Performed 
different procedures and examinations to determine the validity and 
reliabi li ty of clients' financia l statements . Reponed audit findings to 
supervisors and company management. 
Supervisor: Lee Imlay, CPA 
HONORS 
Jewell L. Taylor Fellowship, American Association of Family and Consumer 
Sciences, May 2003 
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T. Clair and Enid Johnson Brown Scholarship, College of Education and Human 
Services, Utah State Univers ity, March 2003 
Phyllis R. Snow Scholarship, Department of Family, Consumer, and Human 
Development, Co ll ege of Education and Human Services, Utah State 
University, March 2003 
Robins Award Nominee (USU Research Assistant of the Year), Utah State 
University, March 2003 
Research Assistant of the Year, College of Education and Human Services, 
March 2003 
Ford Motor Company Fund Student Travel Award, American Council on 
Consumer Interest, April 2002 
Nominee for the 2002 Research Assistant of the Year, Department of Human 
Environments, College of Family Life, Utah State University, January 2002 
Presidential Fellowship Award, Utah State University, August 2001 B May 2002 
MBA Committee Student Representative, University of Utah, August 1999 B 
May2000 
John R. Anderson Scholarship, College of Business, University of Utah, 1999 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
American Council on Consumer Interests 
American Association of Family and Consumer Sciences 
Association for Financial Counseling and Planning Education 
Western Family Economics Association 
Academy of Financial Services 
REFEREED PUBLICATIONS 
Conference Proceedings 
Lawn, J. M. & Palmer, L. (2003). Long-term care insurance decisions: An 
alternative strategy. Western Family Economics Association Annual 
Conference, October 29-3 1, 2003, Salt Lake City, UT. Available from 
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/a/andersenj/WR/research.html 
! 56 
Lown, J. M. & Palmer, L. (2002) . Assess ing the Reti rement Preparation of 
Baby Boomers. Papers of the 42"a Annual Conference: Western Region Home 
Management-Family Economics Educators, Spokane, WA , 2002, 25- 31. 
Palmer, L. (2002). The mongage prepayment decision: A different 
perspective. Proceedings oft he Association for Financial Co~nse/ing and 
Planning Education, Scousdale, AZ, 2002, 123- 125. 
Palmer, L., Bhargava, Y., & Evans, D. (2003) . Recovery from bankruptcy: 
Evidence from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance. Proceedings of the 
Association for Financial Counseling and Planning Education, Savannah, 
GA, 27- 36. 
Palmer, L., O'Neill , B., & Lown, J. (2002). Last chance retirement planning 
with late savers guidebook. Proceedings oft he Association for Financial 
Counseling and Planning Education, Scottsdale, AZ. 2002, II. 
Conference Presentations 
Palmer, L. , O'Neill , B., & Lown, J. (2002). Development of a gu idebook to 
help late savers prepare for retirement. Financial Security in Later Life: 
National Initiative Roll -Out Conference, Mynle Beach, N.C. 
Invited Proceeding Publication 
Hong, G. S., Bhargava, Y., & Palmer, L. (2003). lntergenerational transfer 
behavior of single senior households: Does gender matter (Electronic 
version]? Consumer Interests Annual, 49. 
Man uscripts Under Revision 
Hong, G. S. , Bhargava, V. , & Palmer, L. (under revision). lntergenerational 
transfer behavior of single senior households: Does gender matter? 1-Jal/ym 
Jmem ational Journal of Aging. 
Hong, G. S. , Fan, J., Palmer, L. , & Bhargava, Y. (under revision). Consumer 
leisure travel expenditure patterns by fam ily life cycle stages. Journal of 
Travel and Tourism Marketing. 
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Research in Progress 
Examin ing the relation between household leverage, via mortgages, and financial 
well being of households approaching and entering retirement, and the effect of 
leverage on the volatility of household wealth and net worth. 
Exploring the relation between the presence of a mortgage and debtors ' labor 
market participation in later life. 
Identifying characteristics and motives of households that payoff mortgage debt 
ahead of schedule rather than investing in assets with higher potential yields. 
Exp loring the financi al recovery of previous bankruptcy petitioners. In particular 
examining which behavioral characteristics are important in the recovery from 
bankruptcy and how these practices can be emphasized in proposed mandatory 
debtor education courses. 
Examining the effects of life events and individual I famil y characteristics on the 
likelihood of adopting a will in later life. 
Evaluating the student financial aid counseling project, funded by Utah Higher 
Education Assistance Authority and sponsored by the USU Family Life Center 
and the USU Financial Aid Office. 
